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Table of Content

Foreword

Welcome to the latest issue of the Journal of Contemporary Philosophical and Anthropological Studies (JCPAS). As we delve into the rich tapestry of ideas and inquiries presented in this volume, it is with great pleasure that we continue our journey through the diverse realms of philosophy and anthropology. The contributions within these pages reflect the vibrant and evolving landscape of contemporary thought, offering fresh perspectives and engaging dialogues that stimulate the intellect.

In this issue, our esteemed authors grapple with pressing questions, explore new methodologies, and push the boundaries of knowledge in both philosophical and anthropological domains. As we navigate through their thought-provoking analyses, we invite you to join us in the pursuit of deeper understanding and critical reflection.

The Journal of Contemporary Philosophical and Anthropological Studies remains committed to fostering a community of scholars dedicated to advancing our comprehension of the human experience. We extend our gratitude to the contributors for their valuable insights and to our readers for their continued support. May this collection of essays inspire further exploration and contribute to the ongoing dialogue in these dynamic fields.

Thank you for embarking on this intellectual voyage with us.

Nataliya Bhinder
Editor-in-Chief
Journal of Contemporary Philosophical and Anthropological Studies

Narrative Review

Particularity of the Tomb as a Holy Place

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Abstract: Throughout the ages, peoples and tribes have taken pride in place for themselves, especially the graves of the righteous, and they have been sanctified. And, various religious rituals have been performed to the point that these rituals have become integrated into the customs and traditions of those peoples. In this article, we will address the important characteristics that the Jews carry out through the graves of the righteous in the Jewish religion. The definition of the grave of a righteous friend as a holy place will also be discussed. It must be mentioned that after his death, his dignity, actions, and strength remain influential even after his death. Therefore, his burial place and his grave are considered sacred and pure places, and they are considered popular and attract many visitors.

Keywords: The Tombs, Judaism, Mystical, Hasid, The Just, Holy Place.

Introduction

In the simplest human permanent settlements from ancient times, we can find the planned burial of the dead (Memford 1990:10-16). They probably played an important role in creating the need to find a permanent meeting place, which later became an ongoing settlement. During the wandering period of the Paleolithic man, the dead were the first to get a permanent place: caves, bumpy landmarks with monuments, or mounds of common tombs. These were signs of life, to which they returned from time to time to settle near the tombs of their ancestors. For instance, in the Jewish tradition, in ancient periods, the Jews demanded ownership over the lands in which their fathers were buried (Memford 1990:24). Hence, the city of the dead preceded the city of the living and, to a certain degree it constituted the foundation of the city of the living. In other words, in many traditions, there is a strong religious, social, and cultural relationship between the dead and the alive, which is expressed, among other things, in setting the tombs aside near the settlements' places.

In the Paleolithic burial places, we can find primary clues about city life. In the foundations of a city, we can define the place of ritual meetings, while the tombs represent one of these places. They served as pilgrimage centers. What started as a holy site to which scattered groups came occasionally for rituals and liturgies turned in some places into a permanent settlement site.

Objectives of the Article

This article aims to shed light on the social, religious, and other dimensions of the events that take place in the shrine of the righteous man among the Jews. As well as the motivating factors for visiting shrines and glorifying them. The article also aims to identify the characteristics of the visitors to the shrine and their impact on continuing to visit the shrine of the saint among the Jews. The objectives of the essay require understanding some of the basic terms in the essay, beliefs related to the shrines of Jews and the Jewish religion, to understand their motivations and characteristics.

The Importance of the Topic

The article deals with one of the important topics related to the characteristics of visiting the graves of the righteous in the Jewish community. An anthropological approach is crucial in understanding pilgrimage practices, including the beliefs, rituals, and characteristics of visiting saints. This article is an attempt to contribute to the sociological and anthropological studies of religion by discussing important areas and topics of social reality: "A society that

does not work to understand the actions and behaviors of its citizens and the issues of bias around their actions is the essential "identity society." Therefore, it is important to understand and clarify the human relationship with the sanctities (the shrines and their patrons). Through practices and rituals that translate this relationship.

Attributing Sanctity to a Tomb in Judaism.

Rabbi Nisim Girondi was among the first to write about the importance of the tombs of the Just, though he didn't define them as holy (Drashot 2019:6-15). Rabbi Nisim (born in the city of Girona in Spain in the early 14th century) wrote: "And according to this in discovering to prophets and Hasidic Rabbis in generations, abundance will be abundant on them, and through them, there can be abundance over all the willing from their generation, and to all who come close to them and participate with them. And not only in their lives, for also after their death, their burial places are worthy to find abundance there in one of the sides, because their bones that were tools on which the Godly abundance is applied, still have virtue and honor enough for these things. And because of this, our blessed memory Rabbis (רז"ל) said that it is worthy to stretch over the tombs of the just and pray there because the prayer there will be more accepted, and to find in that place bodies on which the Godly abundance is already applied". From his words, we see that the spiritual virtue of the Hasidic Rabbi itself sanctifies his burial place, as well as his death and life.

The concept is supported by later Jewish authors and philosophers. Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the custom of stretching over the tombs of the Just and the Sacred is an ancient custom, as I mentioned earlier. The origin of this custom in Christianity lies in pilgrimage to the tombs of the martyrs from the dawn of Christianity while indicating their deeds on the anniversary day of their saints' death. Some defined the tomb of the Just as a holy place, such as R. Haim Paltial of Marburg (Germany, the 14th century). He said: "and a holy place (Tomb of Fathers) causes that a prayer will be answered".[1](And thus also said Rabi Yaakov Halevy Ben Moshe Mullin (Germany, the 15th century): that the cemetery is the place of peace of the Hasidic Rabbis, and as such it is a holy and pure place, and the prayer is the most accepted on holy land".[2] Some of the late rabbinical religious authorities wrote in similar terms, such as Rabbi Shlomo Ginzfrid,[3] from the 19th century, author of "shortening laid the table" (Kitzur Shulhan Arukh). "They are used to go in Rosh Hashanah eve after Morning Prayer to the cemetery to stretch over the tombs of the Just, and there they give charity to the poor and carry a lot of pleas so to stimulate the sacred Hasidic Rabbis in the land to recommend good things for us in the judgment day. And also, because it is the place of burial of Hasidic Rabbis, it is a holy and pure place, and the prayer is the most accepted there, for it is held on a holy ground. And God all mighty will give grace due to the Hasidic Rabbis".

Individual Tombs' Ritual of Mystical People

In addition to the general sanctity given to the tombs of the Just, there is also a profound spiritual link between a man and his close relatives who died mainly in order to communicate with him and get a piece of advice and guidance. A pronounced example of this is our master and teacher (האדמו"ר) Rabbi Menahim Mendel Shaniorson (Rabbi Milovivich, הרבי מלובביץ'), who used to visit the tomb of his father-in-law, Rabbi Yusuf Yitzhak Shaniorson (הריי"ץ) permanently, who saw in him a spiritual father and an address to each reference. Many letters from our master and teacher (האדמו"ר) Rabbi Menahim Mendel Shaniorson, in an answer to asking help, included the statement "I will mention on Zion," that is, I will mention your request in my visit to the tomb of Rabbi Yusuf Yitzhak Shaniorson (הריי"ץ) Rabbi Menahim.

Mendel Shaniorson even revealed once in front of Rabbi Shlomo Goren that the reason why he doesn't immigrate to the Land of Israel is because through the masters and teachers of Habad (Hasidic Jewish movement founded by Rabbi Zelman Shneor of Liadi) is to work through the tombs of their proceeds, and therefore he cannot leave it.

The Sacred Hasidic Rabbi, whose tomb is an Object of Pilgrimage

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[1]Brought in questions and answers (Rabbinical discussion), Bruch Marotenburg, Levov prints, Siman Kesed.
[2]Rabbi Yaakov Halevy Ben Moshe Mullin, Halakhot Tanit, 18.
[3]Sholhan A'rukh (Shortening Laid Table), Siman Kahak, section 13.

Almost in all religions around the world, regardless of whether they emerged in the Middle East or originated in the Far East, we can find the phenomenon of admiring images of flesh and blood who excelled and turned to be – in their lives or after their death – ritual and admiration objects (Eliade 1987:132-147). It seems that actually, in the faith systems of monotheistic religions, in which the Godhead is perceived as an abstract entity and distant from daily existence, there is a strong need for mediator entities possessing human-like concrete characterizations (and yet they have miraculous powers that origin is divine), that will decrease the huge gap between God and believers. In this space, there is an important significance to the Hasidic Rabbi, who is buried in a holy place. Religions around the world treat the big problems of human existence very well, such as redemption and immortality of the soul, but they are less attentive to the "small" problems of life – sickness, lack of kids, failure in studies or business, hardships in finding a life partner and other similar distresses woven into the human experience.

Among the monotheistic religions, only in the Eastern Orthodox and Catholic Christianity can we find a wide institutionalization of saints' rituals and assimilation within the formal religious setting. In the Orthodox and Catholic Christianity, the saints are human beings who underwent canonization by the Church authorities after their death due to their abnormal relation with God, their special deeds, or moral excellence. It must be emphasized that living humans are not considered sacred according to the Orthodox and Catholic Christianity, because as long as they are alive, they might commit a sin. The Protestant Christianity, on the other hand, doesn't recognize saints' rituals and allows the title "saint" to all Christian believers.

In Judaism and Islam, the admiration for the Just/Sacred expressed, among other things, in a pilgrimage to the tombs, remained as a sort of popularity which lacks formal institutionalization, and because of that, the scholastic elite of the religious wise men find it hard to accept because of the "pagan" potential hidden in it. In the next part, there will be a clarification concerning the Just`s identity both in Judaism and Islam, One that has the power of pilgrimage to create a mass attraction to the tomb of the righteous.

The Attitude Towards the Just in Judaism

In Judaism, there are four aspects in the attitude to the concept of the Just:
1) According to the Biblical conception, Justness and Hasidism are merits that every man can have: a man who acts in a just way, fulfills all the commandments (mitzvoth), and overcomes worldly temptations is a Just.
2) In the period of the oral Jewish laws (Mishnah) and Talmud, the Just turned to be an ideal image, and very few could reach it. A Just or a Hasid is an exemplary person, and generally, there is appropriateness between his Torah and his behaviors. This is a man who is God-fearing and leads a clear and pure lifestyle. This kind of lifestyle brings him closer to God while he is still alive. In this context, sometimes a man becomes a model by virtue of his greatness in the Torah and sometimes by the virtue of his merits and unique personality. A Just or Hasid lives with a permanent conscience of grace (Hesed), and his conscience is an entity in which everything is connected and related. He is aware and feels not only himself, but also everything happening with others. For example, a prototype of a Hasid (or a Just) is Hanina Ben Dosa, and from stories about him, we can learn something about the special phenomenon of the Just and about his role in this world: it was said about Hanina Ben Dosa that "in each and every day a divine voice came out of Mount Horev (Biblical Mount Sinai) and said: all of the entire world is nourished because of Hanina my son, but Hanina my son is content with a small amount of carob from Sabbath eve to Sabbath eve". In other words, the entire world is nourished thanks to the path that Hanina produces in the world, a path of being content with little (the intention is to be content with little in life and not to ask too much, and this is how Rabbi Hanina would have done with little).
3) According to the Jewish Kabala of the Book of Zohar, which is the mystic central link that was generated in Spain during the Middle Ages, the Just has a prominent role of mediation, being connected with the superiors but also with the inferiors, and by the validity of his role to repair everything that needs reparation in this world and to bring the Godly opulence down on earth. The counting of the righteous that connects between the upper counting and the

lower counting, it is the counting of the kingdom. In this sense the righteous is the conduit that connects the will and thought of God, and he is a sort of channel that links this world with the upper world. The Book of Zohar says: "and this is a first foundation that God almighty has created in his world and it is called light. It is said arm light for the Just" (Tihilim-Psalms is a book of biblical books 97:11). It is also written in the book of Psalms: "the Just is the foundation of the world", by this that the world exists thanks to the Just. Consequently, the Just has a special relation both with people and with the Creator. The judicious said: "When the Just is deceased from the world, the ministering angels say to all mighty God: Master of the Universe, the Just so and so came! He says to them: 'Let the saints come and welcome him and say to him: come in peace, let them rest in peace: Rabi Elazar said: "When a Just is deceased from this world, three classes of the ministering angels come to welcome him" (Ish 1998:17-18). Our Sages of Blessed Memory said: "The Hasidic Rabbis are greater in their death than in their lives".

4) In the world of Hasidism, in the Jewish mysticism from the 18th century in Eastern Europe, a clear distinction was made between the two concepts: the Just and Hasid (Zadic and Hasid), while a pronounced social role was added to the Just (Zadic). The Hasid is the simple believer who follows his Rabbi, the Just (Zadic), and the Just is the congregation leader and its spiritual father. And according to this, only the intention to connect with him raises the person from his low place (Gilat 2005:9).

In addition to this, there are more definitions to the term "Just" ("Zadic"). Some define a Just as a person who gives to everyone what he/she deserves and doesn't take from him/her what he/she doesn't deserve. In the Bible the Just (Zadic) is defined as deriving from the root "justice" ("Zedec"), which means to give everyone what he deserves: to give wages to the good ones and punishment to the bad ones. It is not the title of a man who understands the Jewish mysticism (Cabala), gives blessings, or writes amulets. According to the definition of the Just (Zadic) in Judaism, he must fulfill a number of good deeds and ideal demands of religious and humanistic nature and avoid doing a number of bad and dishonorable deeds which are defined as evil. The Just (Zadic) is a charismatic leader whose image is opposite to a certain degree to that of the Rabi in the traditional congregation, for his spiritual charisma and energy are anchored in this world (Bilu 1998:18-20).

In Judaism sometimes it is also attributed to the Just (Zadic) the ability to make miracles (Mohammad 1990:102-124). In the book of Zohar, there are many references to miracles performed by the Just. Thus, for instance, it is told about the miracles of Rabi Shimon Bar Yohai (רשב"י), "beshet hu nafak lashuka, hazia leyehuda ben garim, amar, adayin yesh lazeh baolam? Natan bo enev ve-asah gal shel azamot" (Yihiel 2004:17).

In general, it seems from the different definitions that according to Judaism, higher spiritual-mystic powers are attributed to the Just. Furthermore, the righteous rather takes on himself the role to assist the others.

The Most Important Finding of the Article.

Through the article, the most important recommendations were reached:

1- Interest in building education and awareness centers to inform people of the importance of visiting the graves of the righteous Jews.

2- Introducing the culture of visiting graves into the educational curricula to raise students' awareness and create a generation interested in visiting the graves of the righteous among the Jews.

3- Paying attention to introducing the graves of the two friends into tourist centers so that the visitor can feel comfortable learning about the importance of those graves.

Conclusion

In this article, I tried to provide an idea about the doctrinal characteristics associated with the graves of righteous Jews, and I intend to provide an analysis of the nature of the relationship between the levels of the cultural structure, i.e. Religiously, at the social, political and even economic levels. I even gave an ethnographic presentation. Recording the beliefs, customs, and traditions practiced by Jewish visitors to their holy shrines and the actions they take during their visit to the shrines of the righteous saints. It should be noted

that to this day there are still many people who still participate in this ritual. Beliefs at that time were keen and interested in shrines due to the close relationships between different population groups within the Jewish community.

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Research Article

Dimension of Religious Violence and its Antecedent Effects on National Integration and Social Development in Nigeria

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Abstract: It is reasonable to believe that the majority of believers believe that social harmony is fostered and guaranteed by "true" religion. Contrariwise, one might virtually conclude that most violent conflicts in the world had their roots in religion. This study undertakes analytical inquiry into the dimension of religious violence in Nigeria with a special focus on its antecedent effects on national integration and social development. Relative deprivation theory was adopted as the theoretical framework of the paper. The instrument of study was survey method relied on descriptive research design. The chi-square approach was employed to assess the reliability of the hypothesis and the questionnaire. Drawing from the findings; security challenges, disintegration of Nigeria society, wanton destruction of lives and properties, economic decadence and political instability among others are few of the havoc done by religious violence in Nigeria. The paper concluded by recommending setting up of religious advisory body, teaching of genuine doctrine, entrenchment of interfaith strategies in the school curriculum, exhibition of attitude of religious tolerance and continued dialogue among the various religious bodies. Addressing the challenges of poverty and mass unemployment by the government is also sacrosanct.

Keywords: Christianity; Islam; national integration; religious violence; social development

1. Introduction

Nigeria is a multicultural, multireligions, and multiethnic country with great potential for social, democratic and economic advancement. Nigeria is described as a fiercely divided state where important political issues are hotly debated along the lines of intricate ethnic, religious, and regional divides (Osaghae, 2009). Nigeria stands as the largest country in the Africa continent and in the whole black race in the world. The country remarkable ethnic and social diversity is substantially influenced by her strong religious divide; with the half of the population being Christian while the remaining half being Muslim.

Most people assume that since democratic authority was restored in 1999, the frequency of religious violence has increased dramatically (Sampson, 2011). There is an enduring culture of distrust and destructive competition between two major religious groups. The prevalent problem of religion in Nigeria is majorly caused by intolerance between the two contending religious groups. However, traditional religion also has a fair number of adherents despite frequently being marginalized, and it is by no means immune from acts of religious violence (Osaghae & Suberu, 2005).

Subsections 10 of Section 1 of the Nigerian Constitution guaranteed religious freedom and forbade the declaration of a state religion (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999). The provision hasn't really done anything to lessen the incidence of religious confrontations as the support of and adoration of state for two major religious groups has contributed to the underlying tensions and rivalry.

Most of the religious crises in Nigeria were both ethnically and politically motivated, the fact that Northerners are mostly Muslim and Southerners are mostly Christians contributed to Nigerian religious security challenges (Okpanachi, 2010), and has become a recurring decimal in the nation. Regrettably, in Nigeria, religion, which is meant to foster redemption and harmony among its diverse followers has turned into a veritable instrument of animalism and violence.

Extremists today use religious beliefs to spread terror and violence, and to encourage followers to target non-members whom they perceive as adversaries for higher purposes. God who supposed to be the centre of religion is no more the centre; people manipulate religion for their own selfish benefit. The happening in Nigeria support religion definition by Karl Max which he described as the "sign of oppressed creatures, the heart of a heartless world, and the opium of the people" (Horii, 2017).

Objective of the study

The primary objectives of the study was to critically interrogate the proportion of religious violence in Nigeria, focusing of its effects on the entire nation. The specific objectives were to:

1.   Identify the related causes of religious violence in Nigeria.
2.   Examine the likely panacea to religious violence in Nigeria.

Research questions

The following research questions were put forward to achieve the main task of the paper in agreement with the literature review:

1.   What are the related causes of religious violence in Nigeria?
2.   What are the likely panacea to religious violence in Nigeria?

Hypotheses of the study

The following hypotheses were formulated to answer the stated questions of the study:

1.   Ho: Religious intolerance is not one of the major factors responsible for religious violence in Nigeria.

     Hi: Religious intolerance is one of the major factors responsible for religious violence in Nigeria.

2.   Ho: Interfaith dialogue is not one of the solutions to religious violence in Nigeria.

     Hi: Interfaith dialogue is one of the solutions to religious violence in Nigeria.

2. Literature Review

2.1 Conceptualization of Religion and Violence

The term "religion" completely makes its way into the English language in the 13th century. The Latin word for religion, "religio" means "reverence to God or the gods, careful pondering of divine things, deity, the res divine." According to Otto (1959), religion can be defined as a relationship between the transcendent and man, who is seen as an incredible yet fascinating mystery to whom man owes complete devotion and obedience.

Man's religious relationship with the transcendent is institutionalized in different religions such as Christianity, Islamic, Hindu, Judaism, Grail message, traditional worshiper, to mention a few. The word "religion" encompasses both individual behaviours associated with a collective faith and collective rituals and discourse resulting from a common belief. People tend to be more emotionally invested in it and less accepting of any unwanted attacks on it because it is built on values (Aliyu, 1996).

Lubeck (1985) rejects the notion that religious belief is a set of myths and holy ideas that followers embrace and believe to be true rather than a belief in God. As a result, he described religion as an abstract act of concepts, principles, or experiences that developed from interpersonal cultural interactions. However, the relationship between man and transcendent can also take on the complete opposite shape; man may strive to dominate and control the transcendent instead of surrender to and obey it, and this can take many different forms.

Religion, as used in Arabic and thus Islamic literature, can refer to being in debt, regaining one's rights, forcing someone to become obedient, holding them accountable, controlling, rewarding or punishing, lending, and so forth (Aliyu, 1996). It may also be seen as a group of people bound together by their shared beliefs and quest for "the divine." An adequate definition of religion would then be an organized system of symbols, values, and rituals centered on the interactions between members of society and God.

Religion implies that man has made an effort to establish a relationship with a supernatural entity, usually represented by God. Implied by this is an interaction between religion and the culture it exists in. As a result, religion has a propensity to skew relationships, which has made it a powerful force in politics and a key factor in all aspects of society, particularly in multireligions nations. It is also a fact that religious relationship is a two-dimensional phenomenon. It is vertical and horizontal, as the relationship between man and God, and the relationship between men and society respectively.

Violence can be defined as an aggressive act directed towards an individual who resists, a condition of turbulence that causes harm and destruction, fury, or the characteristic of being

wild or tumultuous (Sanusi, 2009). It is an act accompanied with threat and actual destruction of life and property (Adedeji, 2022a). In human cultures, violence is a regular occurrence and an essential aspect of the human condition. Sanusi (2009) offers a more comprehensive definition, defining it as "physical and non-physical harm that causes damage, pain, injury, or fear."

Adedeji (2023) also describe violence to include rough treatment, the unwarranted use of force against others, and intentional harm. Violence can be physical or non-physical, and its immediate target can be any person or any material structures, but its ultimate objective is usually to end a person's life or diminish the dignity of a group of people.

2.2 Religious Violence

Religious violence is described as a violence motivated by differences in religion. In the wisdom of Wellman and Tokunbo (2004), religious violence refers to any violence action of a person or a group of people motivated by their religious beliefs. Some religious groups resort to violence as a tactic or attention-seeking. According to Juergensmeyer (1993), "groups such as Christian, Muslim, Jewish Right Wing, Hamas and Khaliatan Movement have used violence to draw attention to them and also articulate the concerns of those within their wider cultures". The conference of the World Council of Churches held between 8th and 12th of February 2002 explained how some religious communities support and legitimize violence, while others oppose it. The conference expressed the opinion that religious traditions can both support and legitimize violence while also serving as tools for fostering peace.

Religious traditions need to assist in combating structural violence by overcoming the desires for material possessions, power, and control that are the motivations that drive violence and violent systems (World Council of Churches, 2002). One thing to keep in mind is that these violent crimes are almost always committed by members of orthodox or mainstream religious groups. In actuality, the religious movements are the expression of strongly held beliefs and religious reactions to societal circumstances. Juergensmeyer (2001) confirmed that researching the relationship between religion and violence entails looking at a number of different problems and connections.

Furthermore, while all faiths are fundamentally revolutionary in one way or another, the concepts and rationales for violence are not exclusive to any one religious tradition. Nowadays, one of the most often used proclamations and catchphrases among religious followers has to do with peace. In actuality, the Muslim greeting "al-salam 'alaykum" (peace be upon you) has spread around the entire world and is now commonly used by people of many faiths. However, a lot of worried Nigerians, for example, have serious doubts about the sincerity of the expressions of peace between Islam and Christianity.

The societies in Africa today, are parties to what Professor Ali Mimazrui called a Triple Heritage: Traditional African Cultures, Islam and Christianity. The nation state sees religion, tribe, ethnicity, and other inscriptive factors, as the cement of common identity. Christianity and Islam have become a source of identity as well as the basis for political activity. Their affiliation has become part of the South-North divide and an ingredient in Nigeria religious conflict (El-Mahdi, 2001).

It has been observed that various religions in Nigeria have anathematized and accused one another of falsity. According to Baha (1982) referenced in Ghanea (2015), each religion views the others as devoid of God's face, existing in utter darkness, and as Satan's offspring, devoid of God kindness and along the direct path of divine wrath. They have thus avoided one another with extreme rigidity, displaying enmity and hostility against one another. The recurring incidence of violence in religious conflicts have become fundamental national challenges in the present day Nigeria society. Religious conflicts are frequent and devastating that are threatening national integration and development.

In addition, the rise in religious fanaticism and fundamentalism has fostered an increase in religious conflict, which poses a threat to peace and stability. Religious conflicts have had a significant negative impact on Nigeria's progress toward national development as well as the advancement of unity and prosperity among its population (Okwueze, 1995). The events in Nigeria have followed a turbulent experience as a result of hatred between Christians and Muslims and South and North disparity respectively.

2.3 The Visible Causes of Religious Violence in Nigeria

Nigeria in particular has witnessed series of conflicts ever since gaining its independence. An adage states that there cannot be smoke without fire. Although certain conflicts stem from political, economic, ethnic, or religious motivations, others have a combination of these

causes. The fundamental idea is that conflicts are inextricably linked to one another. This study is restricted to violence driven by religion in Nigerian. Among the numerous causes of religious violence in Nigeria, the study highlighted the following:

2.3.1 The Upsurge of Religious Fanaticism

The increasing incidences of religious violence in Nigeria can be linked to the growing number of religious fanatics. These religious fanatics carry their dogmatic beliefs and the sectarian religious view to the extreme. They are often prepared to wage war against those who have contrary beliefs and practice that are not acceptable to them. They show little respect for the basic human rights that protect freedom of religion. Furthermore, religious fanaticisms breed animosity, violence against other religious groups (Ashaka, 2001). Religious fanaticism is demonstrated by the Maitatsine riots in northern Nigeria, particularly in Kano and Kaduna, between 1980 and 1985, which were carried out by Islamic militants against Christian adherents (Afegbua, 2010). Four thousand people were killed in the rebellion, while thousands of Muslims and Christians in the north were injured, and properties worth millions of naira were destroyed (Adesoji, 2011).

2.3.2 Religious Intolerance and Fundamentalism

Religious intolerance has been defined as 'hostility towards other religions, as well as the inability of religious adherents to harmonize between the theories and the practical aspect of religion' (Balogun, 1988). A trend within religion known as religious fundamentalism advocates taking religious teachings literally and adhering to them strictly, particularly as a means of restoring orthodox scriptural guidelines and doctrinal originality. The right doctrine and the necessity of organized warfare against the forces of modernism are highly valued by religious fundamentalists (Komonchak et al., 1996). The sharp and mindless intolerance of Muslim worshippers who called for the removal of a cross (the Christian symbol of faith) in the University of Ibadan Christian Chapel some years back as recorded by Soyinka (1991) buttressed intolerance and fundamentalism. It also showed the lip-service which major religious tenets pay to the need for tolerance, peace and understanding. Lack of tolerance of the beliefs and views of others, unguarded and provocative utterances are also the attitude of intolerance and fundamentalism.

2.3.3 Disparaging Preaching and the Stereotyping Publication

Each religious group asserts her exclusive right to eternal life in paradise and her monopoly on religious truths. In severe instances, the messages go beyond the conventional monopolization of essence and enter the domain of disparaging and contemptuous delegitimisation of competing religions. Some religious zealots have stoked severe religious division and ensuing violence by taking use of media opportunities. According to Mu'azzam and Ibrahim (2000), the hegemonic struggle between Christian and Muslims is expressed in the way they portray themselves as the pure and pious against each other, who is viewed as nominal or syncretic. All the actions have contributed to the escalation of accusations on both sides, which in turn has maintained the cycle of violence. The production of critical literature by religious intellectuals that made derogatory statements about competing religions revealed a dangerous aspect of provocation and ridicule in Nigeria (Omotosho, 2003).

2.3.4 Proselytising

The two main religions' proselytizing strategies are one of the main reasons for religious violence in Nigeria. While both Islam and Christianity condemn the use of intimidation and force to spread their beliefs, their methods of preaching have remained psychologically coercive (Omotosho 2003). Unfortunately, Jihad is the most obvious way to campaigns of Islamic conversion, especially in northern Nigeria. Similar to this, the way that Christians conduct "evangelism," or conversion message that emphasize preaching in public settings like prison, hospitals, and public transport, has frequently infuriated non-Christians. They view the common Christian message "I am the way, the truth, and the light; no one comes unto the Father but by me" as offensive and demeaning to other religions, and this remains a powerful catalyst for acts of religious violence.

Proselytizing is the root of the religious conflict between the Muslims Students Society (MSS) and the Fellowship of Christian Students (FCS) at the College of Education in Kafanchan, Kaduna State. A film that portrayed the Othman Danfodio Jihad has already heightened tensions during MSS's annual week-long program (Boer, 2004). The tense environment became fire when FCS guest speaker Rev. Abubakar Bako, a Muslim turned Christian was invited. During his sermon, allegedly cited passages from both the Quran and

the Bible for comparism. The Muslim students determined to punish him for his alleged misinterpretations of the process, which they saw as heresy, because it denigrated Islam and the Prophet Mohammed. Thus, what began as a small misunderstanding between Muslim and Christian college students ultimately ignited the crisis that extended from Kafanchan to Kaduna, Zaria, and Katsina, endangering the stability of the entire nation (Boer, 2002). It was impossible to comprehend the extent of the devastation caused by this calamity.

2.3.5 Religious Preferentialism and Marginalisation

Religious patronage has been ingrained in the public sphere based on the dominance of specific religion followers in positions of authority. It is therefore evident that some government favour some religions over others. With state support, the federal government established pilgrim commissions for Muslims and Christians. Certain states also have separate pilgrim commissions for specific religions, excluding others. Political and economic favoritism towards the preferred religious group, while marginalizing the others, is the result of this mentality. Recalled that the Kano religious crises which took place between 11 and 14, October 1990 was as a result of denial of Ahmed Deedat, a Muslim preacher from South Africa to preach in Nigeria, of which the same request was granted to Reinhard Bonnke, a German Christian preacher to Kano. The granting request met with strict opposition by the Muslims, and it left behind a casualty of over five hundred (500) lives and million-worth property (Adebayo, 2010).

2.3.6 Lack of Religious and Scriptural Knowledge

The wrong interpretation of the religious holy book by people claiming to be experts on the interpretation of sacred texts. Since it is a grave illness for the ignorant to assert their expertise. Many so-called religious radicals take advantage of their followers' inexperience and utilize their limited understanding to interpret the religious holy book to further their own nefarious goals (Adebayo, 2003). Religious violence has also often been the outcome of a lack of sincere effort to understand each other's beliefs and cultures. The wrong interpretation of the Quran led to the formation of Boko Haram. The group's rising leader, Yusuf, tricked them by portraying anything Western as abnormal or wholly un-Islamic.

The group believed that the vulnerability of Islamic group stemmed from Western influence. Muslims should stay away from Western education and institutions in general since they were seen to be unbelievers (Sani, 2011). Many young people, including university students dropped out of school under the influence of the wrong doctrine; and many workers, including highly positioned administrators and lecturers at higher institutions, joined them (Sani 2011). In the states of Borno and Yobe, the group started very quiet small number. As implied by its name, Boko Haram continues to claim to be fighting for Islam today. Though lacking statistical support, the Boko Haram crisis has claimed over five hundred (500) lives and billions of dollars' worth of properties.

2.3.7 Failure of Social Control

Collapse of social control mechanisms such the family, legal system, education, religion, and political system has been attributed by Salawu (2010) as one of the major factors contributing to religious violence in Nigeria. Numerous dysfunctional households have given rise to a sizable pool of young people who, if brainwashed, could be used to carry out religious violence (Salawu, 2010). It's also critical to remember that Nigeria's educational system is in disarray and is unable to impart even basic knowledge, much less discipline and the ethical kind of morality. The religious group is likewise failing to fulfill its predetermined tasks. This is demonstrated by Canci and Odukoya's (2016) research, which asserts that "the escalation of religious violence has been caused by the absence of vehicles of social control that were characteristic of traditional African societies, such as kinship, religious and political systems concerned with the well-being of the community." Hence, a bad signal is set for society.

2.3.8 Failure of the Government to Deal with the Culprit

The government's incapacity or perhaps unwillingness to take decisive action against the culprits is another significant contributing factor to the recurrence of religious uprisings in Nigeria. The repeated nature of crises related to religion in Nigeria can be attributed to this non-deterrence, which may have fostered a culture of impunity and a vicious cycle of violence. When an offender is treated like a sacred cow and released after been apprehended during an uprising, there's a good chance that, barring unforeseen circumstances, he'll take part in the next insurrection (Adedeji, 2022b). It may be argued that this lack of deterrence feeds a vicious cycle of violence and fosters a culture of impunity.

2.3.9 Bad Governance

It's also critical to highlight that widespread poverty and youth unemployment are the results of government inability to form a sound administration and economic advancement through well-thought-out policies. Poverty and unemployment have served as a breeding ground for numerous religious conflicts in the nation, consequently this explains why there has always been a lot of mercenary fighters at any religious crisis (Salawu, 2010). The 2004 religious reprisal in Kano state noted by Owutu (2012) cited in Iloanya et al. (2019) to have caused by irate youths who are victims of failed state. The irate unemployed youths became readily available in any crisis situation to vent their anger on society they believe responsible for their woes. Hence they transferred their anger on non-Muslims in the guise of avenging the killing of Muslims in Yelwa-Shendam in Plateau State.

2.4 Effects of Religious Violence on National Integration and Social Development in Nigeria

Conflict does not always result in unpleasant outcomes; it has sometimes led to positive changes in society. However, religious violence has done greater havoc than good to the existence of Nigeria as a nation. Salient of these damages are highlighted underneath.

2.4.1 Security Challenges

Security challenges, an offspring of religious violence threatened the corporate existence of the country. It can be averred that religious related crisis is a transfer of aggression from one grievance to innocent Nigerian, therefore creating hatred among different religious groups as well as demeaning the sense of belonging to one Nigeria (Fawole and Bello, 2011). Religious violence has always unquestionably posed the biggest security danger to peaceful cohabitation, economic growth, and political development. Religious violence have been cited by Igbuzor (2011) as one of the main causes of insecurity in Nigeria in the recent past. It has not only been a real threat to the unity of the Nigerian state; but also continues to be a serious potential threat to democracy, as evidenced by the widespread demand for sharia and the negative effects that follow its implementation in Northern Nigeria. Religious extremists have turned the Boko Haram insurgency in the northern region into a deadly instrument. With this development, Nigeria can be said to a distressed zone, which is described an area where a terrorist group is threatened; and government-sponsored military action is frequently supported by regional or Western powers to liberate the zone (Szrom and Harnisch, 2012).

2.4.2 Disintegration of Nigeria Society

Religious violence serves as a tenterhook to national unity and integration, promotes chauvinism among different religious groups (Nwabughuogu 2009). It creates prospects of disintegration as one religious group become too cautious to deal with other religious groups. This has degenerated to the level that in some cities in contemporary Nigeria, Christians and Muslims are not living together. As a case where Christians reside in the southern part of Kaduna city, while Muslims occupy the northern part (Jegede, 2019), is unfortunate situation created by religious violence. As such, social cohesion, social fabric, coupled with peaceful coexistence are undermined, leading to a decline in interrelationship.

2.4.3 Weakening of Patriotism to National Ideals and True Nationhood

Religious violence, through their constancy and depth of havoc gives rise to parochialism and other cleavages which religious jingoists exploit for their interest and advantage. It engender a sense of hatred among major religious groups (Christians and Muslims) in the country (Iloanya, Nduka & Okoye, 2019). As this happen, patriotism, brotherhood and a shared sense of oneness is lost in the country. Religious violence has deepen the concept of 'we versus them' as against patriotism to the nation. This really manifest in skimming game played by religion in power. This expressly manifested in the appointment of various offices in the immediate past government of Nigeria under the leadership of President Buhari where all security architecture were under the control Fulani Muslim oligarchy. According to an analysis of ethno-religious violence, religious crises provide a greater threat to peaceful coexistence, the unity of the Nigerian nation-state and its nascent democratic experiment than any other factor posing a threat to democratic consolidation. (Ojo, 2010)

2.4.4 Wanton Destruction of Lives and Properties

The greatest harm of religious violence, most especially between the Christians and Muslims is that they leave in its wake magnanimous loss of precious lives properties. Religious crises have destroyed so many lives which ordinarily would have served as a greater asset to

the country, while properties worth billions of naira have been destroyed (Ogwuche, Nwaneri & Opara, 2023). Imam (2004), cited in Adebayo (2010), states that during the Jimeta Maitatsine crisis, which occurred from February 26 to March 5, 1984, one thousand and four people died and five thousand, nine hundred and thirteen families were displaced. Similarly, during the Gombe Maitatsine disturbance, which occurred from April 26 to 28, 1985, more than one hundred people died. In addition to certain mosques and churches being set on fire, the Kafanchan riot of March 1987 resulted in around twenty-five fatalities and multiple hospitalizations (Lateju & Adebayo, 2006), which is cited in (Adebayo, 2010). Security of lives and properties could not be guaranteed where religious crisis is prevalent.

2.4.5 Economic Decadence

The reoccurrence of religious violence has untold effect on the economy of the nation. Religious disturbances serve as a critical and potent force for economic instability. Violent religious crises with their attendant effects also make foreign investors to relocate their businesses to other peaceful countries that are safe haven for their growth, noting that no investor will be encouraged to invest in an unstable economy (Fawole and Bello, 2011). Tax and rates cannot be collected by government in religious violent prone area, as it implying loss of revenue for development purposes (Ajakaije, referenced in Ogwuche, Nwaneri and Opara, 2023). Olusegun Obasanjo, the former president, bemoaned the religious turmoil that shook Plateau state in 2004 as recorded by Iloanya, Nduka, and Okoye (2019) thus;

companies suffered billion-naira losses; properties worth even more were destroyed; tourists and investors left the region; severely disrupting the economies and social lives of the surrounding states; federal government and certain neighbouring states of the Plateau state spent enormous sums of money managing the crisis.

Any country that conflict is prevalent, the economy becomes stagnant and democratic dividends equally become a mirage.

2.4.6 Political Instability

In a multi-religious nation, peaceful co-existence becomes sine qua none to national development. Sadly, the opposite is the case as Nigeria has continued to experience religious violence coloured with political undertone, more especially between the Christians and Muslims (Ekwenife, 1991). The interference of religion in political affairs is second to none. Political violence between political parties can also lead to instability in the political system. This frequently took the form of political party candidates coercing religious leaders to further their political agendas, which in turn sparked political violence amongst followers of various religions. Political violence becomes a part of the theological concerns that political parties frequently follow in order to achieve their own self-serving agendas. Sadly, religious violence in Nigeria has had untold negative effect on the political development of the nation. Eme (2012) contended that the political class's high-level manipulation is the cause of Nigeria's religious crises.

2.4.7 Disruption and Interruption of the Educational Structure

It is undebatable that education is the cornerstone of sustainable growth. Religious violence in the northern part of Nigeria, however, has a profound effect on education, as the instability brought by numerous examples of religious violence gave birth to brain drain (Adebayo, 2010). Destruction of school buildings and other infrastructure, temporary closure of schools within the violence area and disruption of curriculum designed for students are common damages religious violence noted to have done to education in Nigeria (Adedeji, 2024). The prevalence of religious violence in Nigeria has consequently had a negative impact on the nation's educational initiatives. It follows that one would agree that some young people dropping out of school has been attributed in part to these violence's looming impacts.

2.5 Theoretical Framework

The theory of relative deprivation was used as the theoretical framework for this study. Gurr originated the relative deprivation approach in his classic book, "Why Men Rebel" together with the group mobilization approach (Salawu, 2010). Gurr's extremely basic model, which explains religious conflicts in Nigeria, is found to be helpful. The theory has three steps.

1) He believed that when a religious group is discriminated against, the group will develop grievances.
2) The political activism of the religious community is mobilized in part by some noted factors.
3) A group is more prone to use violence in political activity if it is more mobilized (Gurr, 2011).

It is essential to note that the various religious groups in Nigeria engage in varying degrees of protest and/or insurrection in response to religious discrimination and religious grievances based on such discrimination. For example, when Sharia law was introduced in some areas of Northern Nigeria as a result of the group's religious beliefs, which had an impact on other groups which does not subscribe to similar beliefs. These acts violated the rights of those other groups and sparked a heated reaction. This holds true regardless of the group being violated having a dominating or submissive status in society. This assessment also applies to every instance of religious conflict that has been documented in Nigeria (Omorogbe & Omohan, 2005).

3. Materials and Methods

Curiosity is a desire to know more and this is one of the major characteristics that distinguish human beings. Searching answers to questions or solutions to problems is called "research" which is as old as humanity (Mahesh, 2011). The effort in this section was to explain in clear terms the method that was adopted to produce knowledge that concerns this study. In view of this, the study used a survey method as its research method. A consistent approach of data collection from a subset of a phenomena is called survey research. This allows for a larger interpretation of the data and the creation of generalizations. The success of the survey research approach depends on the careful selection of population-representative samples and the objective gathering of data. This method is effective when dealing with a very large target group that is widespread across a large geographical area like Nigeria. The study employed the use of questionnaire and works of renowned academics and other government vital document with a view to obtain adequate information.

To establish the theoretical claims, the study opted for a case study methodology. The study's theoretical prepositions and analytical generalisations are made in the context of the case's subject of religious violence. Ikeja and Kano municipal local governments of Lagos and Kano states respectively were chosen for this study so as to carry out an intensive study of religious violence. The study chose Ikeja and Kano municipal local governments among others because they comprise multi-religious affiliation with religious violence tendency. Ikeja from Lagos and Kano municipal from Kano were chosen to represent the dichotomy of South and North. One hundred and twenty (120) set of questionnaires were administered to the selected respondents of the population randomly in order to get a balanced outcome as much as possible. Sixty (60) questionnaires each were administered randomly on selected people of the two local governments. The questions were structured to enable the respondents tick appropriate options to portray their opinion on each statement. Guidelines were given to the respondents on how to complete the questionnaires.

Letters of permission were written to the two selected local government to administer research questionnaires to their respective subjects. The questionnaires were packaged into two, labelling each with the name of each local government. The researcher took time to visit the two local governments, one after the other within two weeks with the aids of the letter of introduction from the local government chairmen for administration of the questionnaires to the respondents. Some the staff of the local governments assisted in the distribution of the questionnaires within the council office and handed the returned copies directly to the researcher. However, the researcher did the distribution and collection of others among the communities. The research spent four (4) days in each local government for the distribution and collection of the questionnaires. However, Chi-square, an inferential statistics version of the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS), was used to access the hypotheses and analysis the data gathered from surveys.

The researcher used the Cronbach's Alpha approach to assess the instrument's reliability. Every item and statement in the questionnaire underwent a Cronbach alpha analysis to verify its reliability and check for any significant errors that might have occurred during the survey's development. According to George and Mallery (2003), the alpha scores should be higher than 0.7 as the generally accepted cutoff. Table 1 shows that the instrument's total Cronbach's Alpha was 0.99, indicating strong internal consistency and questionnaire reliability. Consequently, it may be said that all of the questions measuring the same variable are homogeneous.

Table 1. Cronbach's alpha for the items. Reliability statistics

Cronbach's alpha	Number of items
.992	12

Source: Researcher's Analysis of Field Survey, 2024.

The item-total statistics and corrected item-total correlation are displayed in Table 2. The correlation (consistency) between each item and the total of the remaining items is displayed via the corrected item-total correlation. The 0.33 criterion (an item-total correlation of 0.33 implies that about 10% of the variance in the scale is accounted for by that item), was applied in order to determine which items to keep or eliminate. Every one of the eight elements was kept in consideration of this criterion. Indeed, as the column Cronbach's Alpha if item eliminated indicates, removing any one of the eight components will lower the scale's overall reliability. The findings imply that the instrument has a sufficient level of reliability.

Table 2. Item-total statistics

	Scale mean if item deleted	Scale variance if item deleted	Corrected item-total correlation	Cronbach's alpha if item deleted
Q1	29.4815	119.504	.950	.991
Q2	29.5926	121.066	.979	.991
Q3	29.5926	122.206	.961	.991
Q4	29.5000	120.794	.966	.991
Q5	30.2407	126.596	.956	.993
Q6	29.6667	124.785	.915	.992
Q7	29.5463	120.512	.973	.991
Q8	29.6019	120.785	.980	.991

Source: Researcher's Analysis of Field Survey, 2024

Generally, the tests indicated that the instrument was considered appropriate for the study. This implies that the instrument is reliable and "good" for use in the study.

4. Results

4.1 Analysis of Questionnaire

This section details the presentation, analysis and interpretation of data generated through the administration of questionnaires from the selected sample of one hundred and twenty (120) respondents of Ikeja and Kano municipal local governments of Lagos state and Kano state respectively.

One hundred and eight (108) copies out one hundred and twenty questionnaires distributed were returned (Table 3). Thus, the percentage was based on the one hundred and eight (108) questionnaires returned.

Table 3. Analysis of questionnaire administered

Variables	Frequency	Percentage
Returned	108	90
Unreturned	12	10
Total	**120**	**100**

Source: Author Field Survey, 2024.

4.2 Distribution of Responses According To Bio-Data Information

This subsection presents particulars of the respondents using five bio-data information, namely sex, age, marital status, academic qualification, and occupational distribution (Table 4).

Table 4. Bio-data particulars of the respondents

Sex	Frequency	Percentage
Male	68	62.9
Female	40	37.1
Total	108	100

Age group	Frequency	Percentage
20-29	38	35.2
30-39	35	32.4
40-49	25	23.1
50 and above	10	9.3
Total	108	100

Marital status	Frequency	Percentage
Married	48	44.4
Single	35	32.4
Divorced	10	9.3
Separated	15	13.9
Total	108	100

Academic qualification	Frequency	Percentage
Secondary Education	40	37.1
Tertiary Education	43	39.8
Post Graduate Education	25	23.1
Total	108	100

Occupation distribution	Frequency	Percentage
Civil Servant	45	41.7
Student	35	32.4
Business	28	25.9
Total	108	100

Source: Author Field Survey, 2024.

The table shows that 62.9% of the respondents were male while 37.1% were female. In line with the table, 35.2% were between age bracket 20 and 29, 32.4% fall within age bracket 30-39, 23.1% were within age bracket 40-49 while 9.3% fall within age bracket 50 and above. The breakdown of marital status shows that 44.4% were married, 32.4% were single, and 9.3% were divorced while 13.9% were separated. As depicted by table 4, 37.1% of the respondents had secondary education, 39.8% had tertiary education while the remaining 23.1% had post graduate education. Similarly, 41.7% of the respondents were civil servants, 32.4% were student, while 25.9% were in businesses related occupation.

4.3 Presentation of Data According To Variables

This subsection presents the analysis of data according to the variables. It provides empirical insight to the dimension of religious conflict in Nigeria and its antecedent effects on national integration and development. The study used a 4-Point Likert Scale to analyse table 5 and 6.

4.3.1 Related Causes of Religious Conflict in Nigeria

The result of related causes of religious conflict in Nigeria is presented in the table below.

Table 5. Related causes of religious conflict in Nigeria

SN	Related causes of religious conflict in Nigeria	SA	A	SD	D	Mean	Rank
		%					
01	Religious intolerance is one of the major factors responsible for religious violence in Nigeria.	41.7	23.1	16.7	18.5	2.88	1
02	Unemployment is one of the major factors responsible for youth participation in religious violence in Nigeria.	27.8	38.9	15.7	17.6	2.77	3
03	The high level of poverty in Northern Nigeria has made the region to be more prone to religious violence.	23.1	29.6	20.4	26.9	2.49	4
04	The constant religious conflict is a symptom of the social breakdown in the society that has made Nigerian so prone to violence.	32.4	39.8	9.3	18.5	2.87	2
	Grand Mean					11.01	
	Criterion Mean					2.75	

Source: Author Field Survey, 2023.

Above table indicates that 41.7% and 23.1% of respondents strongly agreed and agreed

respectively that religious intolerance is one of the major factors responsible for religious violence in Nigeria, while 16.7% and 18.5% strongly disagreed and disagreed respectively to the assertion. Similarly, the table depicts that 27.8% of the respondents strongly agreed that unemployment is one of the major factors responsible for youth participation in religious violence in Nigeria, 38.9% agreed, 15.7% strongly disagreed while 17.6% disagreed to the claim.

Table 5 indicates that 52.7% the respondents affirmed that the high level of poverty in Northern Nigeria has made the region to be more prone to religious violence while 47.3% repudiated the assertion. In addition, the table reveals that 32.4% strongly agreed that constant religious conflict is a symptom of social breakdown in the society that has made Nigerian so prone to violence, 39.8% agreed while 9.3% and 18.5% strongly disagreed and disagreed respectively.

4.3.2 Panacea to Religious Violence in Nigeria

The result of the panacea to religious violence in Nigeria is detailed accordingly.

Table 6. Panacea to religious violence in Nigeria

SN	Panacea to religious violence in Nigeria	SA	A	SD	D	Mean	Rank
05	There would be considerable reduction in religious violence if its triggers are inculcated in legislation.	27.8	38.9	14.8	18.5	2.76	2
06	Good governance in Nigeria will play a positive role in preventing and reduce religious violence to the barest minimum level.		32.4	41.7	9.3	16.7	2.9
07	Interfaith dialogue is one of the solutions to religious violence in Nigeria	19.4	36.1	16.7	27.8	2.47	4
08	Religion is a resource of peace in Nigeria.	28.7	38.9	14.8	18.5	2.76	2
	Grand Mean					10.89	
	Criterion Mean					2.72	

Source: Author Field Survey, 2023.

It can be deduced from the table above that 66.7% of the respondents asserted that there would be considerable reduction in religious violence if its triggers are inculcated in legislation while 33.3% refuted the contention. It can also be deduced from the table that 32.4% and 41.7% of the respondents strongly agreed and agreed respectively that good governance in Nigeria will play a positive role in preventing and reduce religious violence to the barest minimum level while 26% disavowed the statement.

The table above establishes that 19.4% of the respondents strongly agreed that interfaith dialogue is one of the solutions to religious violence in Nigeria. 36.1%, 16.7% and 27.8% of the respondents respectively agreed, strongly disagreed and disagreed to the claim. The table also depicts that 66.7% of the respondents agreed in entirety that religion is also a resource of peace in Nigeria, 14.8% strongly disagreed while 18.5% disagreed to the claim.

4.4 Testing of the Hypothesis

The chi-square ($X2$) method is used to evaluate the previously stated hypothesis. A frequency table is initially created to compute the expected frequency. Chi-square is the statistical technique that will be applied to test the hypothesis.

Where: $X2 = \sum \frac{(O-E)2}{E}$

Where X2 – Chi-Square
$\sum$ = Summation
O = Observed frequency
E = Expected frequency

In proofing the hypothesis, Ho will represent the null hypothesis while H_i will stand for the alternative hypothesis. The decision of the testing indicates that acceptance of the alternative hypothesis if the calculated: $X2$ is greater than the critical (i.e. value of $X2$ from the tables below) and vice versa. Table 7-10 show the testing hypotheses.

Hypothesis I: Based on statement 1

H_o:Religious intolerance is not one of the major factors responsible for religious violence in Nigeria.

H_i: Religious intolerance is one of the major factors responsible for religious violence in Nigeria.

Table 7. Analysis of respondents on research hypothesis I

Variables	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly Agree	45	41.7
Agree	25	23.1
Strongly Disagree	18	16.7
Disagree	20	18.5

Source: Field Survey, 2023.

Expected frequency
= No of Observed Frequency
  No of Variable
108/4 =27

Table 8. Analysis of chi-square (X2)

Variables	O	E	O-E	(O-E)2	(O-E)2/E
Strongly Agree	45	27	18	324	12
Agree	25	27	-2	4	0.15
Strongly Disagree	18	27	-9	81	3
Disagree	20	27	-7	49	3
Total	108				16.96

Formula for degree of freedom = r-1
= 4 – 1 = 3

Decision: Since chi-square calculated X2 is 16.96 which is greater than critical: X2 of 7.815, we reject the null hypothesis (Ho) and accept the alternative hypothesis (Hi), which state that "Religious intolerance is one of the major factors responsible for religious violence in Nigeria"

Hypothesis II: Based on Statement 7
H_o: Interfaith dialogue is not one of the solutions to religious violence in Nigeria.
H_i: Interfaith dialogue is one of the solutions to religious violence in Nigeria.

Table 9. Analysis of respondents on research hypothesis II

Variables	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly Agree	21	19.4
Agree	39	36.1
Strongly Disagree	18	16.7
Disagree	30	27.8
Total	108	100

Source: Field Survey, 2023.

Table 10. Analysis of chi-square (X²)

Variables	O	E	O-E	(O-E)2	(O-E)2/E
Strongly Agree	21	27	-6	36	1.33
Agree	39	27	12	144	5.33
Strongly Disagree	18	27	-9	81	3
Disagree	30	27	3	9	0.33
Total	108				9.99

Formula for degree of freedom = r – 1
= 4 – 1 = 3

Decision: Since the calculated value (9.99) is greater than table value (7.815), we reject the null hypothesis (H_o) and accept the alternative hypothesis (H_i), which state that "Interfaith dialogue is one of the solutions to religious violence in Nigeria"

It is however worthy to say, based on the above statistical testing of the hypothesis that religious intolerance is one of the major factors responsible for religious violence in Nigeria. However, interfaith dialogue remains one of the solutions to religious violence in Nigeria.

5. Discussion

The main objective of this study is to interrogate the proportion of religious violence in Nigeria, focusing of its effects on the entire nation. The findings of the work are derived from the research objectives. To present the key findings, it is necessary to remind us of the specific study objectives that guide this work. These are to:

1)   Identify the related causes of religious violence in Nigeria.
2)   Examine the likely panacea to religious violence in Nigeria.

5.1 The first research objective search to identify the related causes of religious violence in Nigeria

The study found religious intolerance as one of the major factors responsible for religious violence in Nigeria. This can be substantiated by 64.8% of the total respondents who were in affirmation to the factor of intolerance as a major cause of religious violence through the survey. It was also supported by Soyinka (1991) quoted intolerance of Muslim students at University of Ibadan demanded for the removal of a cross (Christian symbol of faith).

Unemployment and the high level of poverty were also found to responsible for youth participation in religious violence in Nigeria. The factors were backed up 66.7% and 52.7% respectively of the total respondents of the survey. As argued by Salawu (2010), unemployment and poverty provide a fertile ground serious of religious violence in the country. Kano religious attacks of 2004 was identified to have caused by pull of mercenary fighters who are products of bad governance and failed state (Owutu (2012) cited in Iloanya et al. (2019).

In addition, the literature review attributed collapse of social control mechanisms such the family, legal system, education, religion, and political system to constant violence in Nigeria (Salawu, 2010). The survey revealed 72.2% of the total respondents affirmed that constant religious conflict is a symptom of social breakdown and this has made Nigerian to be prone to violence. The research by Canci and Odukoya (2016) provides additional evidence that the lack of social control mechanisms was a significant contributing factor to the rise in religious violence in Nigeria.

5.2 The second research objective sought to examine the likely panacea to religious violence in Nigeria

The survey revealed considerable reduction in religious violence if its triggers are inculcated in legislation. As presented, the result indicated 66.7% of the total respondents were in line with the suggested solution. According to Adedeji (2022b), if a perpetrator is treated like a sacred cow when arrested during an insurrection and then released, it will encourage him to take part in more insurrections. This opinion backed the above suggested solution. Thanks to Adedeji (2022b), this will foster a culture of impunity and a vicious cycle of violence.

It is undebated that good governance in Nigeria will play a positive role in preventing and reducing religious violence in Nigeria. This was evidence in the survey that revealed 74.1% of the total respondents strongly backing the recommendation. In the opinion of Salawu (2010) and Owutu (2012) cited in Iloanya et al. (2019), wealth creation and provision of employment which are incidence of good governance will radically reduce mercenary fighters readily waiting for any crisis situation to vent their anger to the barest minimum.

The study also found that interfaith dialogue is one of the solutions to religious violence in Nigeria as manifested in the people' opinion through the survey result. According to the survey, 55.5% which is far above the average affirmed the workability of interfaith dialogue. Hypothesis testing also led credence on it as the result of the hypothesis depicted the calculated value of 9.99 which is greater than the table value of 7.815. Despite the magnitude of damages done by religious violence to the entire Nigeria nation, majority of the respondents with 66.7% were of the opinion that religion is also a resource of peace in Nigeria. In buttressing this, no religion fight, but the adherents with different interest contrary to religion ethics.

5.3 Relative Deprivation: The Position of the Literature Review

Relative deprivation theory was chosen for this study. The theory emphasises that people are prone to violent when they are being deprive of their need. The theory was originated in the classic book of Gur titled "Why Men Rebel" (Salawu, 2010). The theory is relevant to religious violence in Nigeria. It identified three steps to religious violence in Nigeria as paraphrased below:

1)   A religious group will develop grievances when it is discriminated against;
2)   Some identified factors are mobilized by political activism of any religious group;

3) Adequate mobilization of any religious group makes the group to be more to the use of violence in political activity.

It is essential to note that various religious violence are attributed to some identified factors in accordance to step 2 above. Exemplify this, the literature review has identified some effects of religious violence in Nigeria which is the main objective of the study. Various authors cited identified security challenges; disintegration of Nigeria society; weakening of patriotism to national ideals and true nationhood; wanton destruction of lives and properties; economic decadence; political instability; disruption and interruption of the educational structure among others as some of the salient effects of religious violence in Nigeria.

6. Conclusions

Attempts have been made to discuss the magnitude of the antecedent effects of religious violence on national integration and social development in Nigeria. The paper noted that the two most popular religion Christianity and Islamic that supposed to serve as the vehicle of peace have engaged in bitter rivalry against each other. The work found the upsurge of religious fanaticism; religious intolerance; fundamentalism and extremism; disparaging preaching and stereotyping publication; proselytizing; and religious preferentialism and marginalisation to mention a few as the fundamental causes of religious violence in Nigeria.

The study also revealed that religious violence has done greater havoc to the existence of Nigeria as a nation, among the damages are security challenges, disintegration of Nigeria society, weakening of patriotism to national ideals and true nationhood, wanton destruction of lives and properties, economic decadence, political instability, social effect, disruption and interruption of the educational structure among others. The study has demonstrated that neither the current nor the previous Nigerian administrations have been able to resolve religious violence through well-thought-out and coordinated policy measures. The work also discovered that religious crises may be prevented if those responsible were brought to justice.

Recommendations

Having successfully carried out this study, some recommendations are made:

1. Government should establish a religious council comprising academics and religious leaders from the nation's major religious organizations, with representatives from each state. This committee will act as the national regulatory body for all religious activity. It will also act as a link between different religious organizations and an advisory body to the government.

2. Government should encourage the teaching of genuine doctrine at all levels of education. Similarly, there should be the entrenchment of interfaith strategies in the school curriculum across the nation. This way, religious scholars and leaders will possess the skills for containing the unreasonable aggression of their people.

3. To achieve religious peace and harmony in the nation, adherents of all religions must demonstrate an attitude of religious tolerance when interacting with members of other religions.

4. To maintain peace and stability in the nation, there must be a continued communication between various religious bodies. Arinze (1999) defined inter-religious dialogue as a "meeting of hearts and minds across religious frontiers," noting that it can foster mutual enrichment from a religious perspective as well as peaceful coexistence among the adherent of different religions.

5. More creative approaches are needed to address the issues of mass unemployment and poverty, as poverty breeds desperation, which leads the impoverished to believe any false information presented about other religions. Improving the conditions of the poor and unemployed will significantly reduce frustration and disillusionment over the vulnerability of the poor

6. Government bodies at all levels must support viable and functional venues for traditional leaders. This will significantly contribute to bridging religious gaps. However, government should take it as priority to strengthen and enlarge the Nigeria Inter-Religious Council.

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Research Article

Kant's Copernican Revolution and the Viability of Christian Realism

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Abstract: Kant reduces the range of pure reason to the phenomenal realm. This is a consequence of his Copernican Revolution. If his move is correct, Christianity is forced to either (1) push all of its claims to the phenomenal, or (2) persist in its affirmation that they are noumenal. The former, seems to safeguard its reasonableness but only at the cost of becoming subjective and private. This option entails self-contradictions due to the indispensability of claims like the miracle of the resurrection of Jesus Christ being objectively true, and of Christianity's imperative to evangelize. This option is consequently unreasonable. On the other hand, the latter avoids the former's self-contradictions. We ought to assert these truth claims since they correspond to reality in itself, and we ought to evangelize because the truth of the Gospel applies universally to all human beings. However, it is still open to the charge of unreasonableness in its failure to proportion its claims to the range of reason. All attempts to prove Christianity's correspondence with noumenal reality presuppose propositions that could be nothing but our subjective impositions into reality like the principle of causality. Whatever option it takes, therefore, if Kant is correct, Christianity has to be unreasonable. Arguably, Christianity exhausts the set of possible religions that a reasonable person could take today. Even if it does not, religion still is premised on propositions which themselves could be nothing but our impositions to reality. If Kant is correct, faith and reason are therefore mutually exclusive, contra Aquinas and Wojtyla. This paper shows that if religion is to maintain its claim of being reasonable, it has to direct all of its intellectual powers in refuting Kant's reduction of reason's range to the phenomenal. If it neglects such task, Christianity will self-destruct. Intrinsically bound up to Christianity is the primacy of reason (logos), so Christians who live up to their identity would have to abandon Christianity. If it does not neglect such task, but fails in its attempts to refute it, then it will just prove its atheistic critics are right – religion is for the irrational, after all.

Keywords: Kantian epistemology; Christian realism; fideism; philosophy of religion, Cartesian certainty

1. Introduction

In my modern philosophy class of the former dean of the Immaculate Heart of Mary Seminary in the academic year 2022-2023, Fr. Jose Conrado Estafia, whose primary research area is Stein's engagement to Kant, Hegel, Husserl, and Heidegger, I could recall my excitement when we had to study Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. I knew beforehand of the daunting nature of the task, but such fear was accompanied by the awareness that if anything is worth knowing at all, it would not be unconnected to the relationship between mind and world, which is a topic Kant's First Critique tackled head on.

In the preface to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, Immanuel Kant (1998) introduces his revolutionary idea, often referred to as the "Copernican Revolution" in philosophy. This idea fundamentally alters the way we think about the relationship between human cognition and the objects of our experience. Kant begins by addressing the traditional philosophical assumption that our cognition must conform to the objects. This view suggests that our knowledge and understanding are shaped and constrained by the way objects exist independently of us. According to this perspective, to gain knowledge about objects, we must observe and analyze them as they are, external to and unaffected by our cognitive faculties. Kant observes that all attempts to extend our knowledge a priori (i.e., knowledge independent of experience) under this traditional assumption have failed. In his words, "all attempts to

find out something about them [objects] a priori through concepts that would extend our cognition have, on this presupposition, come to nothing" (Kant, 1998, Bxvi). Philosophers have struggled to gain a priori knowledge about the nature of objects because, if cognition must conform to objects, it implies that our concepts are always secondary and reactive to the way things are, rather than proactive in shaping our understanding.

To address this issue, Kant proposes a radical shift in perspective: what if, instead of assuming that our cognition must conform to objects, we assume that objects must conform to our cognition? This means that the way we perceive and understand objects is not solely dependent on the objects themselves but is instead shaped by the inherent structures and capacities of our cognitive faculties. Kant likens this shift to the revolutionary approach of Copernicus in astronomy. Copernicus challenged the geocentric model, which placed the Earth at the center of the universe and posited that the celestial bodies revolved around it. Instead, Copernicus proposed that the Earth revolves around the Sun, which led to a more accurate understanding of celestial motions. Similarly, Kant suggests that by reversing the traditional assumption and considering that objects must conform to our cognition, we might achieve greater success in metaphysics. Kant argues that this new perspective would better accommodate the possibility of a priori knowledge about objects. If the objects of our experience conform to the structures of our cognition, then it is possible to have knowledge about them prior to and independent of actual experience. This knowledge would be rooted in the way our minds are structured to perceive and understand the world. This proposal is a thought "experiment" which Kant suggests can provide for metaphyiscs some scientific character (Kant, 1998, Bxix). By proposing that objects conform to our cognition, Kant opens the door to understanding how we can have a priori knowledge of objects. This perspective suggests that certain fundamental aspects of objects—such as space, time, and causality—are not properties of the objects themselves but are instead forms and categories imposed by our cognitive faculties. These forms and categories structure our experience and make a priori knowledge possible.

In the context of Kant's Copernican Revolution in philosophy, the assertion that "thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind" (Kant, 1998, A52/B76) gains profound significance. In that class of Fr. Estafia, the students, primarily composed of seminarians although with me, the lone non-seminarian intruder, the professor provided an extended exposition of this said line from the aforementioned work of Kant. We struggled to craft an accurate translation of the said line into Boholano speech. When Kant states that "thoughts without content are empty," he argues that pure concepts or categories of the understanding, when detached from sensory experience, lack concrete meaning. They become mere abstract ideas without any reference to the actual world. The second part of the line, that "intuitions without concepts are blind," asserts that sensory perceptions without the application of concepts remain unorganized and unintelligible. They are mere chaotic impressions without any structured understanding (Kant, 1998, A52/B76).

Kant argues that for knowledge to be meaningful, it is essential to (1) make concepts sensible, that is, concepts must be grounded in sensory experience to have content and relevance. This means integrating abstract ideas with perceptual data. Additionally, it is necessary to (2) make intuitions intelligible. This means sensory data must be organized and interpreted through the application of concepts. This structuring allows us to understand and make sense of what we perceive. Kant continues that neither sensibility nor understanding can function independently to produce knowledge. The understanding cannot intuit or perceive, and the senses cannot think or conceptualize. It is only through their union that knowledge arises. This union involves the understanding structuring and interpreting the sensory data provided by sensibility, turning raw perceptions into coherent experiences (Kant, 1998, A52/B76).

The professor of that class, Fr. Estafia, was a student of the late Romualdo Abulad at the University of San Carlos. In *Kant and Postmodernism*, Abulad (1998) explicates Kant's stance on the boundaries of human knowledge and the nature of reality. Kant contends that human understanding is confined to phenomena, the world as it appears to us, rather than the underlying reality or "things-in-themselves" (noumena). He suggests transitioning from traditional ontology to a more modest "analytic of the pure understanding," emphasizing the limitations of metaphysical speculation beyond human cognition (pp. 41-42). Kant argues that even if noumena exist, our comprehension of them relies on pure forms of intuition and concepts, such as space, time, and categories of understanding. Abulad, echoing Polanyi, reinforces Kant's view that all human knowledge, including scientific understanding, is inherently subjective, shaped by the limitations of our cognitive faculties.

Historical reactions to Kant's philosophy from the perspective of religious thought vary significantly, reflecting diverse interpretations of Kant's ideas and their implications for theology. Permit me to give a surface-level overview as I am yet to read the primary sources on these matters. Schleiermacher, often considered the father of modern Protestant theology, sought to reconcile Kant's emphasis on human subjectivity and the limitations of reason with religious experience. Schleiermacher (1996) argued that religious knowledge is grounded in feeling or intuition, rather than rational understanding alone. For him, religion is primarily a matter of the heart, a feeling of absolute dependence on the divine. In this view, faith transcends reason, but it is not irrational; rather, it operates on a different plane of human experience. Influenced by Kant's critique of reason, Kierkegaard (1983) questioned the adequacy of rational proofs for religious beliefs. He famously argued that faith involves a "leap" beyond reason, a subjective commitment to the paradoxes of Christian doctrine. Kierkegaard's existentialist approach highlights the tension between reason and faith, asserting the importance of personal engagement and commitment in religious belief. In his view, faith cannot be reduced to rational comprehension but requires a passionate commitment to the divine. Barth responded to Kant by emphasizing the transcendence of God and the limitations of human reason (Barth & Gollwitzer, 1962). He rejected attempts to ground theology in human experience or rational speculation, viewing them as inadequate foundations for religious belief. Instead, Barth emphasized the importance of divine revelation as the basis for Christian faith. For Barth, faith transcends reason, but it does not contradict it; rather, it supplements and surpasses human understanding. In his theology, Barth sought to uphold the sovereignty of God while acknowledging the significance of human reason within its proper limits. This brings us to the more general question of Christianity's reasonableness.

Christianity's reasonableness has been a topic of theological inquiry for centuries, with various perspectives offered by key figures in Christian thought. It would be overkill to even attempt to summarize all of the discussions here. Aquinas, in his seminal work Summa Theologica, argued for the compatibility of faith and reason. He developed a robust theological framework that synthesized Christian doctrine with Aristotelian philosophy, affirming that reason could complement and illuminate matters of faith. Pope John Paul II emphasized the harmony between faith and reason in his encyclical Fides et Ratio (Faith and Reason). He argued that faith and reason are complementary ways of knowing, each contributing to a deeper understanding of truth. In the contemporary scene, Craig, a contemporary Christian philosopher, defends the reasonableness of Christianity through philosophical arguments such as the Kalam cosmological argument and the historical evidence for the resurrection of Jesus. He engages in debates and writes extensively on topics related to Christian apologetics. Plantinga offers a sophisticated defense of religious belief through his theory of Reformed epistemology. He argues that belief in God can be rational even without evidence or argument, as it may be properly basic for individuals within a Christian context. Swinburne provides rational arguments for the existence of God based on the principle of credulity and the principle of testimony. He contends that belief in God is reasonable given the available evidence and the coherence of Christian doctrine. On the other side, J.L. Mackie presents critiques of religious rationality, including the problem of evil and the challenge of religious diversity. He argues that the existence of suffering and conflicting religious claims undermines the rationality of religious belief. These contemporary thinkers engage in ongoing debates about the reasonableness of Christianity, contributing to a rich dialogue between defenders and critics of religious faith. Reading and debating these have been my personal preoccupation in my spiritual journey, as I had undergone a series of turnarounds in my religious outlook, but that is a topic for another paper.

Religious assertions often prompt philosophical inquiries into their objectivity and subjectivity, dissecting various dimensions of religious belief. Philosophical discussions on miracles delve into defining them, establishing criteria for identification, and assessing their compatibility with natural laws. David Hume (2007), for instance, contends that miracles, by defying natural order, are inherently implausible and lack sufficient evidence to override established scientific principles. Religious traditions frequently assert historical events and figures, prompting scrutiny of historical evidence, source reliability, and alternative interpretations. Debates ensue over the historical accuracy of religious narratives, such as the life of Jesus Christ in Christianity. Philosophical contemplation grapples with the challenge of expressing transcendent truths about the divine using human language. Scholars explore the limitations of language, employing analogies, metaphors, and symbolism to convey ineffable concepts inherent in religious discourse. Hume's skepticism scrutinizes miracles,

arguing their violation of natural laws renders them highly improbable and inadequately supported by testimonial evidence. His critique underscores the subjective nature of religious claims by highlighting empirical limitations. Dawkins (2006) emphasizes the scientific improbability of religious assertions. He contends that naturalistic explanations offer more credible accounts of the universe's origins and structure, challenging the objectivity of religious worldviews. Scholars like N.T. Wright staunchly defend religious realism, asserting the objective validity of religious claims. Wright (2003) presents historical evidence supporting Jesus' resurrection. Scholars rigorously analyze and critique religious assertions, complicating the issue of the objectivity and subjectivity inherent in religious convictions.

Kant's (1960) *Religion within the boundaries of mere reason* arose from his initial plan to write a series of essays on Christian doctrines. When one of these essays faced censorship, Kant combined them into a single volume, positioning it as a philosophical rather than theological work to navigate scrutiny. Despite leading to eventual censorship, it was successfully published Primarily, Kant inquires into the interface between historical faith, predominantly Christianity, and pure rational religion. He aims to discern the common ground and disparities between these realms, with a particular focus on delineating genuine religious tenets from mere cultural constructs. Kant endeavors to utilize the insights gleaned from philosophical examination to distinguish authentic religious principles from those rooted in tradition or societal norms (Pasternack & Fugate, 2022).

Kant (1960) endeavors to harmonize reason and religious belief by asserting that moral principles inevitably lead to religious faith (Preface, pp. 1, 5). He argues that reason and Scripture are not only compatible but fundamentally aligned (p. 11), indicating a mutual reinforcement between rational analysis and religious texts. Kant emphasizes the primacy of virtue over grace, positing that moral effort should precede divine grace (p. 190). This view places moral effort at the forefront, with divine grace following as a consequence of virtuous living. He further elaborates that those who genuinely strive to fulfill their duties may hope that any deficiencies will be supplemented by divine wisdom (p. 159; cf. p. 130), highlighting a complementary relationship between human endeavor and divine assistance.

The concept of the highest good is central to Kant's philosophy, as it cannot be realized by individuals alone, yet they feel a duty to work towards it, necessitating belief in a moral Ruler of the world who aids in achieving this goal (p. 130). Kant interprets Holy Scripture as a narrative that represents the moral struggle within humans through personifications of good and evil, akin to a legal battle before a supreme judge (p. 73). Kant asserts the inherent goodness of natural inclinations (p. 51) and maintains hope for moral redemption even for those with a corrupted heart, as long as they possess a good will (p. 39). He criticizes clericalism for its close resemblance to paganism (p. 168) and insists that religious narratives must be taught to promote morality (p. 123). He downplays the intrinsic authority of the Bible, considering it a book that has fallen into men's hands and suggesting that traditional faith might be something that chance has tossed into our hands (pp. 98, 100).

Kant advocates for interpreting Scripture in the interests of morality, even if this interpretation appears forced, as it should support moral incentive over literal meaning (p. 101). He acknowledges the importance of ecclesiastical faith as the only instrument capable of uniting people into one church (p. 103) and considers the possibility that such unity cannot be maintained without a holy book and an ecclesiastical faith based on it (p. 123). Kant asserts pure reason will ultimately prevail over historical and empirical religious practices, leading to a pure religion of reason that will rule over all (p. 112). He emphasizes the need for human effort in moral endeavors, asserting that man must act as if everything depended on him to hope for divine support (p. 92; cf. pp. 149ff). Despite the weakness of human nature, Kant contends that a church cannot be established solely on pure faith (p. 94), underscoring the necessity of a structured religious community to support moral development.

Abulad (1998) highlights Kant's enduring relevance in the postmodern era, particularly through his critique of pure reason. Abulad notes a common tendency towards selective critical thinking today, wherein individuals critique only ideas that differ from their own beliefs, failing to subject their own beliefs to the same scrutiny. Kant's critique of pure reason, however, stands out for its comprehensiveness, challenging all knowledge and assumptions without exception. This aligns Kant with other critical thinkers throughout history, including Descartes, Bacon, Nietzsche, Husserl, and Derrida. Abulad suggests that this critical approach is essential for the postmodern consciousness, which questions all knowledge and assumptions without attachment. Religion often becomes a target for postmodernists due to its deeply ingrained beliefs, which may hinder the emergence of a more profound understanding of Christianity. Abulad speculates on the possibility of freeing oneself from

these beliefs to allow for a more perfect form of Christianity to unfold, transforming beliefs into enriching pointers to the Kingdom. Ultimately, Abulad acknowledges that history will determine the outcome of such transformations, expressing hope for the success of contemporary prophets who envision a broader vision beyond current limitations.

Critiques of Kant's reduction of reason span various philosophical traditions, offering a broad spectrum of perspectives. Again, this is only a very surface-level sketch, as it can take an entire paper to discuss each, and I do not have the relevant expertise. Neo-Kantian philosophers like Hermann Cohen and Paul Natorp argued that Kant's abstract individualism overlooked the communal and historical contexts essential for moral consciousness, while Wilhelm Windelband and Heinrich Rickert emphasized the dynamic nature of human values and knowledge. From other traditions, Nietzsche criticized Kant's suppression of individuality through universal moral laws, and Hegel highlighted the neglect of historical consciousness. Marx argued that Kant's abstraction ignored material and social conditions, Wittgenstein challenged the notion of universal rationality rooted in practical language use, and Habermas reinterpreted reason as a social and communicative process. These critiques collectively suggest that Kant's framework, while foundational, requires expansion to accommodate a more comprehensive understanding of human reason and moral development.

Theological responses aimed at reconciling faith and reason post-Kant have been multifaceted, with scholars like Karl Rahner, Hans Urs von Balthasar, and John Henry Newman offering significant contributions. Rahner (1992), in his work Foundations of Christian Faith, emphasizes the compatibility of faith and reason by proposing a transcendental approach that posits God as the condition of possibility for human knowledge. Von Balthasar (1983 for the first volume of seven), through his theological aesthetics expounded in The Glory of the Lord, suggests that beauty serves as a bridge between faith and reason, allowing for a deeper apprehension of divine truth. Newman, in *The Grammar of Assent*, explores the role of personal conviction and intuitive apprehension in religious belief, advocating for a nuanced understanding of faith's rationality. These theologians, while building on Kantian insights, offer theological frameworks that engage with contemporary challenges to faith and reason, providing rich resources for dialogue between theology and philosophy.

If Kant's reduction of reason is accepted, it fundamentally reshapes the relationship between faith and reason, impacting both religious and secular perspectives. From a religious standpoint, accepting Kant's reduction means acknowledging the limits of rational proof in matters of faith, leading to a shift towards a more experiential or existential understanding of religious beliefs. This perspective may emphasize the importance of personal religious experience over logical arguments, prompting a deeper exploration of faith as a subjective encounter with the divine. Given my background as a former member of a Catholic apologetics organization, I am not blind as to how this could really seem to be abandonment of orthodoxy and embrace of lukewarmness. On the other hand, secular philosophers may interpret Kant's reduction as reinforcing the autonomy of reason and promoting skepticism towards religious claims that cannot be empirically verified. This could lead to a greater emphasis on scientific inquiry and rational discourse in addressing existential questions traditionally addressed by religion. This coincides with the popular embrace of self-help literature, a phenomenon that hurts the pride of many academics who want to be read by the public but are read less.

In terms of case studies or examples, Kant's critique poses significant challenges to specific religious doctrines such as the resurrection, creation, and divine intervention. For instance, in the case of the resurrection, Kant's emphasis on moral reasoning and the limitations of empirical evidence may lead to skepticism regarding the historical authenticity of the resurrection accounts in the Christian tradition. Similarly, Kant's distinction between phenomena and noumena raises questions about the compatibility of the biblical creation narrative with scientific understandings of cosmology and evolution. Moreover, Kant's critique of miracles and divine intervention challenges traditional religious interpretations of supernatural events, prompting theologians to reconsider the role of divine agency in the world in light of rational scrutiny. Overall, Kant's reduction prompts a reevaluation of religious beliefs in light of philosophical critique, inviting both defenders and challengers to engage in nuanced theological and philosophical discourse. Nevertheless, the weight of abandoning Christian realism, or at even religious realism in general, is not neglible, as is expressed by Paul:

14 if Christ has not been raised, then our preaching is in vain and your faith is in vain. 15 We are even found to be misrepresenting God, because we testified of God that he raised Christ, whom he did not raise if it is true that the dead are not raised. 16 For if the dead are not raised, then Christ has not been raised. 17 If Christ has not been raised, your faith is futile and you are still in your sins. 18 Then those also who have fallen asleep in Christ have perished. 19 If for this life only we have hoped in Christ, we are of all men most to be pitied. (1 Corinthians 15:14-19, RSV)

An earlier version of this paper has been presented at the 6th De La Salle University - Undergraduate Philosophy Conference (August 2021). Its earlier title was "Blind Faith or No Faith at All: Kant's Copernican Revolution Entails Christianity's Reducibility to the Unreasonable. I think it is time, after some years hopefully lent me a little maturity, to get these preliminary thoughts published open for engagement and critique. After all, iron sharpens iron.

2. Materials and Methods

Having discussed the background of the issue and having hammered on the gravity of the question of Christian realism and the potential threat wrought by Kant's Copernican turn, this paper uses the philosophical methodology of presenting an argument by explaining what it means, exploring rebuttals, and launching counter-arguments. Stated a little formally, the argument of this paper runs thus:

> **Premise 1:** Kant's Copernican Revolution reduces the range of reason to the phenomenal realm.
> **Premise 2:** If the range of reason is limited to the phenomenal realm, then Christianity must either:
>> (Option 1: Abandon Christian Realism) Push all its claims to the phenomenal realm, which leads to self-contradictions and unreasonableness because essential claims like the resurrection are supposedly revealed to be objective and evangelism requires a certain dogmatic content to be spread. (Option 2: Retain Christian Realism) Affirm that its claims, at least the most central ones, are noumenal, which also leads to unreasonableness because it fails to proportion its claims to the range of reason.
> **Premise 3:** Either option taken by Christianity results in unreasonableness if Kant's reduction of reason's range is correct.
> **Conclusion:** Therefore, if Kant's Copernican Revolution is correct, Christianity (and by extension, religion) is reducible to the unreasonable.

If Christianity cannot maintain its claim of being reasonable, it will self-destruct, making Christian realism untenable given that Christianity intrinsically upholds the primacy of reason (logos). If Christianity fails to refute Kant's reduction of reason, it validates the view that religion is irrational, unless the there are other religious systems that are about as argumentatively rigorous as Christianity. But the author is of the opinion that Christianity has the strongest argumentative edge already among mainstream organized religions. Therefore, for Christianity to sustain its reasonableness, it must refute Kant's reduction of reason; otherwise, it will prove atheistic critics correct and demonstrate that religion, at least mainstream organized religion is irrational.

3. Results and Discussion

The central argument is constructed on three premises that systematically lead to the conclusion that if Kant's reduction of reason to the phenomenal realm is correct, Christianity faces a profound challenge to its claim of being a reasonable faith.

3.1. Premise 1: Reduction of Reason to the Phenomenal Realm

To fully understand the challenges Kant's framework poses to Christian theology, it is essential to first explore his reduction of reason to the phenomenal realm. Kant's Copernican Revolution confines the scope of pure reason to the phenomenal world, excluding any knowledge of the noumenal, or things-in-themselves. This foundational shift implies that human cognition is limited to appearances and cannot access ultimate realities directly. While debates about Kant's personal beliefs abound among scholars, such interpretative issues are beside the point for the substantive discussion at hand. The crux of the matter lies in the implication of Kant's philosophical framework *as construed in this paper* on the relationship between faith and reason, particularly within Christian theology.

Of course there has been pushback. Pope John Paul II, for instance, seems to command

a change in method, namely, the prioritization of metaphysics over epistemology as a strategy to bridge mind and world, but did not justify such move. We might even be able to subject John Paul II's command to Edward Feser's (2008) critique of the philosophical assumptions of the figures of the Enlightenment as "problematic methodological stipulation into a discovery, since the issue itself is whether the method corresponds to how reality really is. Refusal to raise the critical question simply because one cannot accept its conclusion, sounds so much like blind faith. As Clarke (1994) writes:

> I appreciate Gilson's insistence on a direct realism of knowledge and the futility of trying to deduce in some way the reality of the world outside the subject from anything like a Cartesian cogito, still we cannot just ignore the great epistemological struggles of modern philosophy over realism as though they never happened and left no mark on the Western philosophical consciousness. (p. 3)

To counter Kant's reduction, some philosophers like Moreland and Craig (2017)offer alternative views on the nature of knowledge and certainty. When articulating their epistemology to counter the reduction of reason to the phenomenal realm, Moreland and Craig argue that "[k]nowledge does not require total [Cartesian] certainty," so mere possibility of error without grounds does not count against knowledge." Hence, if Kant's reduction of the range of reason is no more than a logical possibility, then we can have epistemic certainty that our conclusions in Christian apologetics are of the noumenal realm itself. However, that mere logical possibility does not entail epistemic possibility is not that persuasive if Kant's (1998) reduction of reason's range to the phenomenal is not simply a logical possibility that he opens, but proposition that he proves, as he claims to have done (Bxii).

Are there problems with option 1? It seems that there are. To reiterate, first, it seems to go against the Christian claims about objective reality, like the Gospel itself which St. Paul speaks about "of first importance" in 1 Corinthians 15, which include the historicity of the crucifixion, death, and bodily resurrection of Jesus Christ. Second, what is believed merely subjectively seems necessarily private, that is, cannot be justly obligated to be held by others other than the believing subject. This is true even for the beliefs of the apostles about Christ, including the Gospel itself. But if Christianity is Christianity at all, it has to take the words of Christ seriously, of which the commissioning of the apostles to publicize the Gospel they believe in is part (Matthew 28:19-20), including the punishment to those who do not believe (Mark 16:16). This position is thus self-contradictory, and thus holding to it nevertheless would be a faith that is unreasonable; one that is blind.

By restricting reason to the phenomenal realm, Kant challenges the traditional understanding of rationality and knowledge acquisition. This shift has profound implications for Christianity, as it necessitates a reevaluation of how religious claims are understood and justified in light of the limitations imposed by Kantian epistemology. Thus, the reduction of reason to the phenomenal realm serves as a pivotal premise in the argument, highlighting the need for Christianity to address the challenges posed by Kant's philosophical framework in order to maintain its intellectual coherence and relevance.

3.2. Premise 2: Christianity's Response Options

Given the constraints imposed by Kant's epistemology, Christianity faces two possible response strategies." The first option is to push all of its claims to the phenomenal realm.15 The second option is not to reduce its claims to the phenomenal. The first option entails relegating all claims, including miracles and the resurrection, to the phenomenal realm, resulting in internal contradictions and undermining Christianity's objective truth claims. Descartes' demand for Cartesian certainty and Abulad's skepticism further challenge Christianity's assertion of objective truth. Conversely, retaining Christian realism affirms essential claims in the noumenal realm but risks unreasonableness by surpassing reason's justificatory bounds. Babor's ambivalence and Pope St. John Paul II's emphasis on objective truth underscore the complexity of reconciling faith with reason within Kant's framework. Ultimately, Christianity grapples with the tension between blind faith and rational skepticism, as Kant's critique of Cartesian certainty prompts believers to confront the limitations of reason in apprehending divine truths.

3.2.1. Abandon Christian Realism

This option entails reinterpreting all Christian claims, including miracles and the resurrection, as purely phenomenal events. However, this approach results in self-

contradictions. For instance, the resurrection of Jesus Christ is traditionally understood as an objective, historical event, central to Christian faith. Reducing it to a subjective phenomenon undermines its objective truth and compromises the imperative to evangelize, which requires a solid, dogmatic foundation. Thus, this option renders Christianity unreasonable due to internal inconsistencies. Nevertheless, this option is still worth thinking about. This reinterpretation aligns with the Cartesian demand for absolute certainty, a perspective that has significantly influenced modern philosophical thought. In his *Meditations on First Philosophy*, Descrates (2015) wrote:

> Since reason already convinces me that I should abstain from the belief in things which are not entirely certain and indubitable … it will be enough to make me reject them all if I can find in each some ground for doubt. (Chapter IV)

We call this absolute certainty that Descartes thinks to be that which rational animals are entitled to hold "Cartesian certainty." Even if Descartes is long gone, Abulad (2017) "[t]his skeptical attitude has never thereafter left us." We could see a lot of continuity between his thought and that of Kant. Regarding the existence of God, Abulad (2017) wrote that "To one who has faith, anyway, no proof is necessary, but our students need also to know that no proof is possible" (p. 9). In his view, what Aquinas realized after his vision which made him think all he wrote was straw:

> That revelation, I imagine, produced in St. Thomas the certitude which no intellectual argument could possibly replace, making it even more emphatically correct to say that no proof is indeed possible, that even the most formidable argument is straw compared to that revelation which is a sheer gift, not anything acquired naturally by, albeit coming as a result of, man's effort. (p. 14)

What, then, is our only access of God? It is by means of entry into a Bergsonian subjective, personal, mystical consciousness (Abulad, 2005). It is not by attempts to prove He exists noumenally as the first principle of all things, as said above. In fact, "[t]he search for the principle of knowledge ends with the realization that there are no principles, that all the so-called principles belong to us and not the thing itself" (p. 14). If we could know God at all, it would not be my means of proofs from reason, since Kant's antinomies of pure reason show that reason at the same time proves that God does not exist. Time has come when reason has itself deconstructed reason. Consequently, belief in God is by means of faith alone. For Abulad, even the most basic proposition upon which all of Christianity rests, namely that "God exists," is pushed to the phenomenal realm. How much more for all other Christian doctrines all of which are based upon the existence of God? The skepticism inherent in Descartes' demand for Cartesian certainty and Christianity's failure to meet that standard seem to force Christians to abandon claiming that Christianity is true, not just for them or subjectively, even intersubjectively, but extra-mentally.

Attempts to counter Craig's point that mere logical possibility does not entail epistemic possibility is worthless if Kant's reduction of reason's range to the phenomenal is not simply a logical possibility that he opens, but proposition that he proves, as he claims to have done.67 His accusation of a performative self-contradiction to the postmodernist does not refute their argument itself, even if it does show the hypocrisy of the person holding it. In any case, therefore, Craig's attempt to defend the Christian faith from the charge of blindness still seems to fail.

3.2.2. Retain Christian Realism

This option involves maintaining that essential Christian claims are noumenal. However, asserting noumenal claims without the capacity for reason to access the noumenal realm fails to proportion these claims to the limits of reason. This leads to unreasonableness as it demands belief in claims that exceed the bounds of what reason can justify.

Confidence that Christianity is *extra-mentally* true, that is its claims correspond to the *noumenal realm*, seems to be intrinsic to the Christian religion. It is the certainty that the First Vatican Council is referring to when it says "If someone has said that the one true God, our creator and Lord, cannot be known by the natural light of human reason with certainty through those things that have been made, let him be anathema." It is what Saint Paul means by "clear perception" when he says that "Ever since the creation of the world his invisible nature, namely, his eternal power and deity, has been clearly perceived in the things that have

been made. So they are without excuse" (Romans 1:20).

Let us turn to a contemporary of Abulad, the late Dr. Eddie Babor of Holy Name University. Babor (2007b) thinks that God's existence can be proven by reason, as is clear when he writes in his book that "God's existence cannot only be proven but can be demonstrated" (326). What is the finest way of demonstrating it? Aquinas's Five Ways. As Babor (2007b) states, "The finest a posteriori demonstration of God's existence is the celebrated Thomistic Five Ways" (p. 323). He also seems to think that God's existence is somehow independent from human belief, and thus noumenal, as he also writes, "God's existence is neither conditioned nor determined by man's belief" (p. 324). So it is evident from these texts that Babor is at minimum a realist about theism. It is not yet made clear, however, if this realism extends to Christianity, and most particularly to Catholicism.

In stark contrast to Abulad's fideistic approach, Msgr. Joseph Clifford Fenton presents a robust defense of Christian realism. Fenton refuses to push the claims of Christianity to the realm of the phenomenal. In Laying the Foundation, Fenton (2016) insists that "that a doctrine which is revealed in the sense in which she speaks of revelation could not be fully demonstrated as credible apart from these external motives or criteria" (chapter 6). How could something that is merely phenomenal be external to us? Implied therefore is Fenton's affirmation of Christianity's claims to be more than phenomenal. Fenton thinks that "[r]ather than honoring God, a man would commit an offense against Him were he to believe without reason that some statement had been communicated by the Creator." (chapter 1). Fenton's position is diametrically opposed to fideism, which seems to be held by Abulad. Fenton further writes:

> A demonstration of rational credibility would be to no purpose, unless it were visible in the light of natural reason as such. In other words, a man need not possess the gift of divine faith in order to see that the content of that faith is something which he can accept prudently with the assent of divine faith. A man must have the gift of divine faith in order connaturally and perfectly to accept with certainty the teachings contained in the body of divine revelation. But he does not stand in need of any gift of faith in order to be able to demonstrate and to realize that the acceptance of this doctrine is perfectly in harmony with the tendencies and the demands of his own human nature. (chapter 1)

For Fenton, we can know that God exists through observation and the application of the principle of causality (chapter 4). Metaphysical reasoning shows the possibility of miracles (chapter 1) and reliability of divine revelation, if any (chapter 6). We then test claims of divine revelation if they really are impossible by natural power alone, which therefore have to be divine. Historiographical research enables man to judge sources of historical data pointing to Christianity being truly divinely revealed. Historical study shows Catholicism to be the original and true Church that Jesus founded (chapter 19). All these can be known with a "certain judgment is made without fear or danger of the contradictory proposition being true" (chapter 1). Fenton does not only assert the certitude of his claims. The bulk of his book is dedicated to demonstrating such claim of certitude. In any case, it should have been clear by now that Fenton chooses option 2.

Craig (2008) emphasizes the distinction between knowing and showing the truth of Christianity. He writes that "in answering the question 'How do I know Christianity is true?' we must make a distinction between knowing that it is true and showing that it is true. We know Christianity is true primarily by the self-authenticating witness of God's Spirit. We show Christianity is true by presenting good arguments for its central tenets." (p. 58) Nevertheless, let this not distract us from Craig's affirmation that certain Christians claims, including the resurrection, happened objectively at some point within history. After marshalling various lines of evidence, Craig (1981) argues they together "point with unwavering conviction to the same unavoidable and marvelous conclusion: Jesus actually rose from the dead" (chapter 5).

While Craig differentiates between knowing and showing the truth of Christianity, this option still faces opposition from postmodernist views. Against those whom "neo-Kantian postmodernists" of which Abulad seems to be one of, who assert "that there is in some sense a thing-in-itself, an external reality. … [but] that we have no way to get to reality and, since we know nothing about it, reality itself is a useless notion and, for all practical purposes, can simply be ignored," Moreland and Craig (2017) argue that they perform what they deny, making their position self-refuting. Postmodernists "appear to claim that their own assertions about the modern era, about how language and consciousness work, and so forth are true and rational, they write literary texts and protest when people misinterpret the authorial intent in

their own writings, they purport to give us the real essence of what language is and how it works, and they employ the dichotomy between modernism and postmodernism while claiming superiority for the latter. In these and other ways postmodernism seems to be self-refuting" (chapter 6).

Building on this dialogue, Pope St. John Paul II exemplifies somebody who seeks "to reconcile reason with faith." Karol Wojtyla, or Pope St. John Paul II (1998), emphasizes that Christianity makes certain "objective" and thus noumenal truth claims: "The second aspect of Christian philosophy is objective, in the sense that it concerns content. Revelation clearly proposes certain truths which might never have been discovered by reason unaided, although they are not of themselves inaccessible to reason. Among these truths is the notion of a free and personal God who is the Creator of the world, a truth which has been so crucial for the development of philosophical thinking, especially the philosophy of being" (no. 76).

Pope St. John Paul II (1998) affirms the noumenal character of central Christian claims, and that "in reasoning about nature, the human being can rise to God" (no. 19). The confidence that this could be done, including in all conclusions arrived philosophically, however, has been recently threatened. He states that how "[r]ecent times have seen the rise to prominence of various doctrines which tend to devalue even the truths which had been judged certain. … In short, the hope that philosophy might be able to provide definitive answers to these questions has dwindled. (no. 5). Since he substantially agrees with Kant's point we need to acquire certitude, we must locate the cause of this decrease in confidence and if possible, mend it. He locates its beginnings in Descartes, who, by making subject, not being, the focus of inquiry, has basically preempted Kant's Copernican Revolution. Pope John Paul II (2005) writes:

> we have to go back to the period before the Enlightenment, especially to the revolution brought about by the philosophical thought of Descartes. The cogito, ergo sum (I think; therefore, I am) radically changed the way of doing philosophy. In the preCartesian period, philosophy, that is to say, the cogito, or rather the cognosco, was subordinate to esse, which was considered prior. To Descartes, however, the esse seemed secondary, and he judged the cogito to be prior. This not only changed the direction of philosophizing, but it marked the decisive abandonment of what philosophy had been hitherto, particularly the philosophy of Saint Thomas Aquinas, and namely the philosophy of esse." (pp. 8-9)

What was that which the philosophy of being (esse) that prioritizing it over the cogito is better for philosophy, and thus eventually for the return of confidence in reason's access to God? It is its feature that, Pope John Paul II (1998) thinks, it "is based upon the very act of being itself, which allows a full and comprehensive openness to reality as a whole, surpassing every limit…" (no. 97). In other words, because *esse* is simpler than the categories of phenomena and noumena in that it transcends both, it is able to encapsulate both and thus conclusions based on it are not limited to just one of the two categories. Consequently, if God is proven to exist based on reasoning from esse, the question of whether He does so only in the realm of the phenomena or the noumena becomes moot, thereby recovering the certainty of reason's capacity to know God.

Not all noumenal claims of Christianity, however, seem to be demonstrable by Aquinas's metaphysics of esse. Some of its claims, in fact, seem repugnant to its implications, one of which is God's wisdom. The cross seems contrary to the Wisdom of God, and hence may be a stumbling block for faith. Pope John Paul II writes that ""The preaching of Christ crucified and risen is the reef upon which the link between faith and philosophy can break up…" However, reason's plumbing into its depths eventually sees that (1) it actually happened, and (2) and it is actually fitting for an all-wise God, makes the cross at the same time "also the reef beyond which the two can set forth upon the boundless ocean of truth. Here we see not only the border between reason and faith, but also the space where the two may meet" (no. 23). For Pope John Paul II, we do not have to abandon reason so we can make room for faith. Faith enhances reason by prompting it to explore avenues it wouldn't have considered on its own. It is not enclosed upon itself as phenomena are. It breaks into the world.

3.3. Premise 3: Resulting Unreasonableness

The tension between these two options culminates in the final premise, which explores the inherent unreasonableness of either stance if Kant's framework holds true. Whether Christianity opts to abandon or retain its realism, it inevitably confronts unreasonableness if

Kant's framework is correct. The attempt to reconcile faith with the limits of reason either collapses into self-contradiction or overextends the claims of reason. Interestingly, Babor's own reflections illustrate the complexity and internal conflict within this philosophical discourse between options 1 and 2. This perplexity is evident when Babor (2007a) writes:

> For a philosophy to be a philosophy, it should be based on reason and sustained by critical awareness or critical thinking. Philosophy has no place for God; it cannot accommodate faith. The moment faith is given a room to act as a binary of reason, reason would collapse to the recesses of faith. (p. 15)

Whereas Babor has been cited earlier to have stated that Aquinas' Five Ways demonstrate the existence of God, we will now see him saying that Scholasticism, of which Aquinas is a key part, is not a serious philosophy because it is based on faith. To Babor (2007a), "Scholasticism is not a serious philosophy. It rather uses philosophy in order to hide its true identity. … But can we really know God? Meister Echart prefers to call God Divine Nothingness" (p. 27). He also states, "We don't have access to know who really God is. That is why we believe in God—the very essence of faith, anyway, is to believe in something we are not sure of. The act of Scholastics are encroachment in the holy quarters of the divinity of God. Augustine and Aquinas are more of theologians than of being true-blooded philosophers" (p. 25). What does Babor really believe? It is hard to tell. But I bet it is option 1 – the pushing of all of the knowledge-claims of reason about God to the phenomenal, leaving access to God in Himself to faith alone. This judgment is based on his words in his paper wherein there is less motivation to defend Aquinas than those in his book, for he uses his book as a textbook in a Catholic university, namely Holy Name University, wherein he himself says "Scholasticism enjoys so much prominence" (p. 25).

Another way to reconcile those texts from Babor is to take him as willing to grant noumenal knowledge of the existence of God, but not of any religious doctrine premised on it, perhaps due to the Gap Problem (Pruss, 2009). After all, the Catholic faith may just be at a phenomenal since it asserts a lot more than the existence of God, including dogmas. This is, perhaps, hinted by the conclusion of his paper in which he strikes his final blow against "Scholastic" or even "Catholic Christian philosophers," and "Hail to the thinkers who dared to think without fear despite the medieval mandate of the Church which has the power to control her faithful about what to think, what to feel, and what to do." To him, "postmodernism is…a blessing in itself to all of us since it unrelentingly and unmitigatingly deals a rebellious blow against a structure whose main line of command is to believe in a centralized power of administration, management, and monopoly of knowledge" (pp. 24-26). This is almost like Kant's (1992) motto of the Enlightenment—Sapere Aude! Kant defines immaturity as the incapacity to employ one's understanding without external assistance, attributing it not to a lack of knowledge but to a deficiency in resolve and courage. His famous imperative "Sapere Aude!" ("Dare to know!") epitomizes the essence of enlightenment, urging individuals to embrace intellectual autonomy. Kant identifies laziness and cowardice as the primary factors perpetuating immaturity, leading individuals to persist in dependence even after liberation from external constraints. He critiques the guardians who foster this state of dependency, ensuring that individuals perceive the path to maturity as hazardous and arduous. Stop listening to the clergyman who tells you not to argue but only to believe. After all, if religious claims are in the realm of what is unknowable, what is faith in what others have claimed about it, but blind?

What Immanuel Kant seems to have shown is that this Cartesian certainty is impossible, especially when it comes to the existence of God. If we know the Catholic faith, or the Christian faith in general, is false, and yet we still choose to believe it, then our faith is irrational, or in other words, blind. Kant, despite his efforts to salvage causality from Hume, the bankruptcy of the religious system that hangs on it. If Kant was right, then we are forced to choose: blind faith, or no faith at all?

4. Conclusions

Ultimately, Kant's impact on the discourse about faith and reason leads us to a crucial juncture, necessitating a choice between blind faith and intellectual autonomy. The paper concludes that, under the constraints of Kant's reduction of reason, Christianity—and by extension, religion—is rendered unreasonable. This outcome challenges the intrinsic Christian commitment to the primacy of reason (logos) (John 1:1). Therefore, Christianity

must actively refute Kant's limitation of reason to preserve its rational foundation. Failure to do so would vindicate atheistic critiques and signify that mainstream organized religion is inherently irrational.

This analysis underscores the imperative for further research to explore strategies for reconciling faith with reason within Kant's constraints. Future inquiries should delve into alternative responses while considering the broader implications of Kant's philosophy on religious discourse. Such endeavors will enrich theological dialogue and deepen our understanding of the relationship between faith and reason in contemporary discourse. The issues tackled in this paper are nested in the wider issues of the relation between mind and world—a field of research that is in its peak productivity due to players beyond philosophy and theology, most of which fall under cognitive science.

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Conceptual Article

Elucidation of Richard Bernstein's Engaged Fallibilistic Pluralism as an Epistemic Framework for the Historiographical Reconstruction of the Sciences

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Abstract: This paper aims to elucidate the theoretical framework corresponding to Richard Bernstein's pragmatic turn through a diachronic reconstruction of his early and mature work. It employs a structured-qualitative reading, focusing on 'engaged fallibilistic pluralism' as the central category of his thought. The relevance of this work lies in providing an epistemic scheme that can be applied in the historiographical reconstruction of deliberative praxis carried out by plural communities of research, particularly in the controversies inherent in the history of anthropology, considering the categories of 'juxtaposition' and 'critical constellation' of researchers.

Keywords: Bernstein; fallibilism; pluralism, pragmatism, engaged fallibilistic pluralism

1. Introduction

Pragmatism is a philosophical movement that originated in the United States during the last quarter of the 19th century, and is based on the so-called 'pragmatist maxim' formulated by Charles Peirce (1839-1914), according to which the meaning of a proposition has to be found in its practical consequences. In this sense, the term 'pragmatism' was popularised by William James (1842-1910), who used it during a speech in 1898 entitled "Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results", delivered at the University of California (Berkeley). The third important figure in the classical pragmatist movement is John Dewey (1859-1952), whose extensive writings had a considerable impact on American intellectual life, in debates on education and democratic politics.

Meanwhile, in the 20th century there has been a resurgence of interest in pragmatism in so-called neo-pragmatist authors such as Richard Rorty, Hilary Putnam, Nicholas Rescher, Jürgen Habermas, Susan Haack, Robert Brandom and Cornel West. Thus, Richard Bernstein belongs to this group of contemporary philosophers who have taken an interest in the pragmatist problem, updating the debates.

2. Materials and Methods

This paper employs a structured-qualitative reading of Richard Bernstein's early and mature works, focusing on 'engaged fallibilistic pluralism' as a category for reconstructing, in diachronic-historiographical terms, an epistemic-conceptual framework applicable to the historicisation of scientific controversies. Specifically, it focuses on controversies within the history of anthropology, using the categories of 'juxtaposition' and 'constellation', with which Bernstein identifies the critical and plural community of investigators as the principal epistemological unit of analysis in epistemology.

3. Results

The biographical reconstruction of the academic life of Richard Bernstein is based on the work of Roberto Frega (2014), in their interview with the philosopher, 'Interview with Richard J. Bernstein', published in the European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy; as well as the synthesis in The Dictionary of Modern American Philosophers (Shook, 2005) and Bernstein's own autobiography, titled "The Romance of Philosophy", first published in Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association (2007),

and later in Pragmatic Encounters (2016).

This section is structured by outlining three periods in 3.1. The author's academic life, and 3.2. General description of Bernstein's work.

3.1. Reconstruction of Bernstein's Academic Life

3.1.1. Formation and Philosophical Initiation (1949-1958)

Richard Bernstein, the youngest of three siblings, was born on May 14, 1932, in Brooklyn, into the second generation of a family of Jewish Polish immigrants. He experienced, according to his autobiography "an intellectual awakening" (Bernstein, 2016, p. 14) at Midwood High School, one of New York's most prominent public high schools. Upon completing his studies, he was still too young to be drafted and fight in World War II – an event in which his older brother died – so he enrolled at the University of Chicago, applying from 1949 to 1951 to a liberal curriculum for advanced students structured around an interdisciplinary course in philosophy and history of Western science taught by Joseph Schwab: "From the time I arrived, I was reading Plato, Aristotle, Galileo, Darwin, Herodotus, Thucydides and many other great books. In the undergraduate college there was a negative attitude toward pragmatism. I don't recall ever reading any of the classical pragmatic thinkers" (Frega, 2014). In this propitious university environment, Bernstein wrote *Love and Friendship in Plato: A Study of the Lysis and the Phaedrus*. Some of his fellow students, Susan Sontag, Richard Rorty, George Steiner, Philip Roth and Mike Nichols, would later also become his philosophical interlocutors: "It was in Chicago that I discovered and fell in love with philosophy" (Bernstein, 2016, p. 14).

After graduating, at the age of 19, Bernstein returned to New York and, in order to complete his credits, applied to a course at Columbia University taught by Justus Buchler – who had obtained his doctorate in 1938 with the thesis *Charles Peirce's Empiricism*. Although this was his first encounter with pragmatist philosophy, his real interest only came in 1953, in the context of Yale University, which he attended on Rorty's recommendation: "I started my graduate studies at Yale in 1953. John E. Smith (who was then a young assistant professor) organized a small reading group dealing with John Dewey's Experience and Nature. This was a revelation for me. I discovered that Dewey was a far more interesting thinker than I had been led to believe. At the time there was a prevailing prejudice that pragmatism was little more than a fuzzy anticipation of logical positivism" (Frega, 2014).

There, the author wrote one of his first publications, *John Dewey's Metaphysics of Experience* (written in 1960 and published in 1961), in which he understands the distinctive character of classical pragmatism with respect to analytic philosophy, which should be read "as bold counter-move to the fashionable tendencies and trends in Anglo-American analytic philosophy at the time" (Shook, 2005, p. 216). During his stay at Yale, he encountered Hegel's work for the first time, through Antigone: "I spent hours reading the text over and over again until I had a breakthrough-like an epiphany. I experienced the power of Hegel. That seminar on Hegel changed my life" (Bernstein, 2016, p. 15). Along with his studies on Dewey, he was also influenced by Paul Weiss – from whom he learns what it means to be a true philosopher – and Wilfrid Sellars, from whom he understands how to employ the tools of analytic philosophy for the interpretation of the history of philosophy. The presence of Paul Weiss, editor of *Peirce's Collected Papers*, also brings him closer to the study of pragmatism.

Yale, for its part, was significant for Bernstein for its pluralist perspective and its resistance to the hegemony of analytic philosophy and logical empiricism; it was in this way that the philosopher distinguishes there between 'analytic ideology' and 'analytic philosophy', in order to extend the field of action of the former to the belief that philosophical analysis is the restrictive and exclusive way of practising philosophy.

3.1.2. Teaching and Philosophical Dialogues (1958-1989)

Having received his PhD from Yale (1958), he taught for a year at the Hebrew University in Israel, and on his return became assistant professor and editor (until 1971) of *The Review of Metaphysics* founded by Paul Weiss. In 1965, in a nationwide event, he is denied tenure, sparking a major student protest. So, he moved to Haverford College, a prestigious liberal arts college where she remained until 1989. At Haverford, Bernstein sees the opportunity to build a Philosophy Department with a pluralistic spirit, central to the structuring of a curriculum that offered courses on Plato, Aristotle, Hegel, Heidegger and Wittgenstein. In this period, Bernstein wrote his first book *John Dewey'* (1966), followed by *Praxis and Action*

(1971), *The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory* (1976), *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism* (1983) and *Philosophical Profiles* (1986); it is there that he recognised himself as a teacher:

In 1989 he was elected president of the Eastern Division of the APA (American Philosophical Association), at whose inauguration event Bernstein invited Derrida, and in which he delivered a famous speech entitled "Pragmatism, Pluralism, and the Healing of Wounds": he synthesised the most significant themes of his pragmatist philosophy. That same year he was invited to teach at the New School for Social Research in New York City, an institution whose origins are radically influenced by pragmatism, and together with Agnes Heller and Reiner Schürmann he directed the reconstruction of the Philosophy Department and served as its chairman from 1989 to 2002. During this period he wrote The New Constellation: *The Ethical-Political Horizons of Modernity/Postmodernity* (1992), *Hannah Arendt and the Jewish Question* (1996), *Freud and the Legacy of Moses* (1998) and *Radical Evil: A Philosophical Interrogation* (2002).

3.2. General description of the work

Bernstein's work is characterised here in consideration of the critical contributions proposed by Shook (2005), Greeve Davaney & Frisina (2006), Green (2014) and Craig & Morgan (2017). This section is structured around a general characterisation of Bernstein's philosophical work and the way in which he has conducted it. First of all, it presents the: 3.2.1. Deliberative Ethos of the work, in which the purposes of Bernstein's philosophical project are made explicit, strictly speaking: a) To self-correct and update the characteristic themes of classical pragmatism, and b) To go beyond Cartesian foundationalism. The section then concludes by naming the most frequent philosophical interlocutors in Bernstein's work.

3.2.1. Deliberative Ethos of the Work

Shook (2005) Greeve Davaney & Frisina (2006), Green (2014) and Craig & Morgan (2017) concur in characterising Bernstein's philosophy as a critical-reconstructive deliberative proposal that appeals to account for the 'pragmatic turn' in thought, on the basis of a revitalisation of the classical debates conducted by Peirce, James and Dewey, according to a *ēthos* committed to fallibilist pluralism that attempts to a) Self-correct and update the characteristic themes of classical pragmatism; and b) to go beyond Cartesian foundationalism: "Bernstein's philosophy is pragmatic insofar as it is committed to anti-foundationalism and the self-corrective character of inquiry; an irreducibly social understanding of subjectivity; fallibilism with regard to all cognitive, practical, and moral claims; and engaged pluralism in grappling with the varied approaches to philosophical questions and what counts as a philosophical question" (Shook, 2005, p. 221)

Bernstein's work includes reflexions on philosophy of science and ethics, structured from a deliberative-pragmatist perspective, in an interdisciplinary conversational framework. In *The Dictionary of Modern American Philosophers* (Shook, 2005), Bernstein's use of an immanent reconstructive-critique with ethical purpose is also made explicit as a general mode characterising his own philosophical practice.

Craig & Morgan (2017) for their part, interpret Haverford's founding Quaker tradition as occupying a significant place in Bernstein's understanding of the meaning of promoting the shaping of deliberative communities with pluralist *ēthos* (p. XX). They also refer to the following passage from *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism*, in which Bernstein understands that: "A true 'conversation' -which is not to be confused with idle chatter or a violent babble of competing voices-[it] is an extended and open dialogue which presupposes a background of intersubjective agreements and a tacit sense of relevance" (Bernstein, 1982, p. 2). It is furthermore, in the preface to this work, where the philosopher warns that the recovery and clarification of the concepts and experiences linked to dialogue, deliberation and communication also presuppose, in the agonistic encounter, friendship, solidarity and erotic love.

Bernstein argues that he does not himself propose to build 'bridges' between different philosophical orientations, since "no single orientation or style of thinking has an exclusive possession of philosophic insight" (Bernstein, 1999, p. X), from which follows the practice of committed fallibilist pluralism as a *ēthos* or ethical disposition that implies being open to the other in his radical otherness; by the way, Zambrana (2017) understands that: "Pluralism is an *ēthos*, then, because it entails more than the recognition of difference. It involves self-reflection and the willingness to revise one's deepest commitments or even to change one's life" (Zambrana, 2017, p. 125). Therefore, dialogue in Bernstein's work disposes to a pluralistic and fallibilist *ēthos* that has two purposes:

a) Self-correcting and updating the characteristic themes of classical pragmatism: Bernstein considers as a general starting point for formulating the deliberative framework of his work the approaches of Peirce, James and Dewey, in order to articulate the 'pragmatic turn' in philosophy through dialogue with contemporary authors such as Wilfrid Sellars, Emmanuel Levinas, Michel Foucault, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Jürgen Habermas, Jacques Derrida, Alasdair Macintyre, Martin Heidegger, John Mcdowell, Richard Rorty, Hilary Putnam, Hannah Arendt, Hans Joas, Charles Taylor, Jeffrey Stout, Seyla Benhabib, Nancy Fraser and Robert Brandom, among others. Thus, in *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism* he believes that the classical pragmatists were ahead of their time, so that part of his academic work consisted in dialoguing with non-pragmatist authors in order to find affinities that would then broaden his own pragmatist orientation (Bernstein 2016, p. 24). Thus, along with Bernstein, philosophers such as Richard Rorty, John E. Smith, John J. McDermott, and John J. McDermott: "Understood in differing ways that classical pragmatism would need to be critically adjusted and collaboratively redeveloped to meet contemporary theoretical and practical needs in the sciences, politics, religion, culture, and daily living, employing for that purpose the same kind of open-ended conversational process that the original pragmatists developed to create their new philosophical framework" (Green, 2014, p. 2).

With the 'pragmatic turn' Bernstein has shown himself to be an active participant in revealing his own philosophy from a renewed vision of the classic themes of pragmatism, in order to satisfy the need to respond to contemporary issues: "Both Bernstein's open and dialogical approach to multiple perspectives and his own constructive positions have encouraged his inclusion in a wide range of debates and conversations' (Greeve Davaney & Frisina, 2006, p. VIII).

b) Going beyond Cartesian foundationalism: Engaged fallibilistic pluralism requires overcoming what Bernstein calls 'Cartesian anxiety' and which entails the crystallisation of an attitude of methodical doubt, out of whose consequent fear the philosophical search for a foundation from which to build the general structure of knowledge is erected.

The pluralist ēthos co-implicated in the dialogue that fosters a fallibilist commitment differs from Cartesian philosophical solipsism, which is rooted in the solitary and meditative resolution of mental experiments that exclude intersubjective conflict, and is then systematically nourished by a debilitating doubt. Thus, Bernsteinian pragmatist fallibilism does not lead to a radical scepticism that homogenises and denies the totality of beliefs; instead, the exorcism of 'Cartesian anxiety' allows us to avoid the belief that there is a need for an ultimate and infallible philosophical foundation.

3.2.2. *Philosophical Interlocutors*

Bernstein's deliberative framework included Richard Rorty, Jürgen Habermas, Hannah Arendt, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Jacques Derrida as his most frequent interlocutors. In 1972, he began an extensive dialogue with Jürgen Habermas and Hannah Arendt, manifested firstly in the works of 1976 and 1983: "It is as if I, who started working in the pragmatic tradition and became increasingly interested in the Hegelian-Marxist legacy, encountered Habermas, who, starting with the Hegelian-Marxist legacy, was moving closer to the spirit of pragmatism" (Bernstein, 2016, p. 20).

Regarding his friendship with Habermas, Bernstein insists on the critique of the transcendental-Kantian character of the theory of communicative action and writes *Habermas and Modernity* (1985), a collection of essays in which he interprets the concept of modernity in the transcendental pragmatist philosophy of the German philosopher. Concerning Hannah Arendt, their first encounter took place during a six-hour meeting in Haverford: "And that was the beginning of a friendship that lasted until her death in 1975" (Bernstein, 2016, p. 22). Bernstein dedicates *Beyond…* to Hannah Arendt, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Jürgen Habermas, and Richard Rorty, and it is with Arendt that he especially dialogues in works such as *Hannah Arendt and the Jewish Question* (1996), *Radical Evil* (2002), *The Abuse of Evil: The Corruption of Politics and Religion since 9/11* (2006), and *Why Read Hannah Arendt Now?* (2018). In this sense, the author's interest in issues related to religious identity and evil is emphasised: "His meditations on Hannah Arendt and Judaism exhibit sensitivity to the religious dimensions of the life of a self-proclaimed pariah" (Shook, 2005, p. 221). In this line of work, he publishes *Violence: Thinking without Banisters* (2013), a work in which he dialogues with Carl Schmitt, Walter Benjamin, Hannah Arendt, Frantz Fanon, and Jan Assmann.

On the other hand, he has published critical studies on Gadamer since 1968, especially regarding *Wahrheit und Methode* in the "Review of Metaphysics": "During the time when Habermas and I taught our seminar in Dubrovnik, another seminar was given at the same

time dealing with phenomenology. Gadamer was a frequent visitor, and we had many discussions over a good bottle of wine in Dubrovnik. When Gadamer started his regular visits to the United States, he frequently visited Haverford. And I felt myself increasingly influenced by – although also critical of – his hermeneutical orientation" (Bernstein, 2016, p. 22). Then, from the studies on Gadamer, Bernstein makes explicit the relationships of identity and difference between the concept of 'hermeneutical understanding' and 'pragmatist *phronesis*'.

By the 1970s, Bernstein began difficult readings of Derrida, with the help of his wife Carol; the difficulties were overcome with Derrida's essays on Levinas: "I began to see that Derrida, from his earliest work, was preoccupied – indeed obsessed – with questions concerning ethics and responsibility. Subsequently, I wrote an essay, 'Serious Play: The Ethical-Political Horizon of Jacques Derrida" (Bernstein, 2016, p. 23). Bernstein's recent work includes religious and psychoanalytic themes, explicit in *Freud and the Legacy of Moses* (1998). However, the author continues his inquiry into pragmatism in *Ironic Life* (2016), directly referring to his friend Richard Rorty and Jonathan Lear, based on a reinterpretation of Socrates and Kierkegaard, Gregory Vlastos and Alexander Nehamas. In *Pragmatic Encounters* (2017), essays are compiled in which Bernstein deliberates with classical and contemporary pragmatists, as well as with Herbert Marcuse, Hannah Arendt, or with Paul Ricoeur's readings of Freud. That same year, *Taylor and Bernstein* (2017) was published, a work in which Daniel Gamper systematises the dialogue between both philosophers. Finally, in *Pragmatic Naturalism: John Dewey's Living Legacy* (2020), he debates with Robert Brandom, John McDowell, Richard Rorty, Wilfrid Sellars, Peter Godfrey-Smith, Philip Kitcher, Bjorn Ramberg, David Macarthur, Steven Levine, Mark Johnson, Robert Sinclair, Huw Price, and Joseph Rouse in order to discuss Dewey's naturalism.

In summary, Bernstein's philosophical work is developed from a critical-reconstructive deliberative practice, committed to a pluralistic and fallibilistic ethos aimed at a) Self-correcting and updating the characteristic themes of classical pragmatism; and b) Going beyond Cartesian foundationalism.

4. Discussion

In this section a thematic articulation of the work, appealing to Hegelian philosophy as a key to interpret the meaning of the purposes a) and b), is carried out. Thus, it is taking into account the work of Zambrana (2017) and the pragmatist themes posited by Bernstein in his presidential address of 1988 to the American Philosophical Association, "Pragmatism, Pluralism, and the Healing of Wounds," namely: 1. Anti-foundationalism and critique of Cartesianism, 2. Fallibilism, 3. Community of inquirers and sociability of practices, 4. Radical contingency, and 5. Irreducible plurality of perspectives and orientations. In *Pragmatic Encounters*, Bernstein (2016) unifies 4 and 5, renaming 5 as: The agent's perspective and the continuity of theory and practice, and adds 6. Democracy as a way of life. According to Shook (2005), the Hegelian influence is evident in the period 1970-1980, as an example of the concomitant critique in the disputes between Marxism, existentialism, pragmatism, and analytic philosophy (Shook, 2005, p. 219). The presence of Hegel appears in *Praxis and Action* (1971), as well as in *The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory* (1976) and *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism* (1983), that is, during his tenure at Haverford College (1965-1989). Rocío Zambrana (2017) agrees with this assessment, and adds: "You will find no books on Hegel among Richard Bernstein's long list of publications, yet Hegel is a constant figure in Bernstein's work" (Zambrana, 2017, p. 123). In this way, Hegel would intercede in 4.1. Bernstein's critique of absolute dichotomies and 4.2. The unity of theory and *praxis*.

4.1. Bernstein's Critique of Absolute Dichotomies

4.1.1. Unstable Dialectic

Shook (2005, p. 219) understands that the Hegelian influence is particularly evident in *Praxis and Action* (1971), a work in which Bernstein understands action from the Hegelian perspective of Marx. Zambrana (2017), on the other hand, identifies that Bernstein's use of Hegel permeates the treatment of anti-foundationalism, fallibilism, the formation of critical communities (themes 1, 2, and 3) and the inescapability of contingency and pluralism (theme 4/5), especially in *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism* and *The Pragmatic Turn*: "In 'Hegel and Pragmatism' chapter 4 of The Pragmatic Turn, Bernstein tracks Hegel's influence on what can roughly be seen as three generations of pragmatists. The first generation is comprised, among others, of Peirce, Dewey, and James; the second generation is represented by Wilfred Sellars; and the third generation is developed by John McDowell and Robert Brandom ("the

Pittsburgh Hegelians") (Zambrana, 2017, p. 130).

Bernstein conceives Hegelian philosophy as a substantive key when articulating 'the pragmatic turn' around the notion of 'Cartesian anxiety' as a critical source of foundationalism that dichotomises theoretical and practical philosophy in absolute terms. According to Zambrana, "Bernstein reads Hegel against himself in light of his pragmatist commitments" (Zambrana, 2017, p. 131); and unlike the classical pragmatists, who sought to recover from Hegel "the sense of life, dynamism, and especially the vision of interrelated organic reality" (Bernstein, 2013, p. 101), Bernstein's anti-foundationalism assumes the philosophical possibility of formulating a 'dialectic without *Aufhebung*' that is, without the Hegelian integrative moment consisting of the reductive 'negation of the negation' to then "do justice to both elements, without succumbing to the illusion that they can finally be integrated" in a dialectical – Hegelian and anti-Hegelian – form in which the totalising reconciliation of opposites does not occur.

This *unstable dialectic* is concomitant with the pluralistic and fallibilistic *ethos* that characterises the way Bernstein himself practises philosophy, according to Shook (2005, p. 219) and from which it is then possible to think about the dialectical articulation between theory and reason.

4.1.2. Non-Representational Perspective of Knowledge

Bernstein believes that the correspondence theory of truth, framed within the foundationalist dichotomy between idealism and empiricism, is susceptible to being overcome through the readings of Hegel carried out by the second and third generation of pragmatists. Therefore, the philosopher acknowledges the validity of Sellars' critique of the so-called 'myth of the given'. In this sense, McDowell argues that a review of the absolute terms corresponding to idealism or coherentism as well as Sellars' 'myth of the given' makes it possible to critique the ontological difference between mind and world. From Bernstein's perspective, both extremes, idealism and empiricism, are subjected to foundationalism: "For Sellars and Brandom, what is needed is an inferential, non-representational account of knowledge. Brandom takes this thought further by arguing that such inferential articulation – such mediation – is a matter of social practices" (Zambrana, 2017, p. 132). Thus, according to Brandom's Hegelian interpretation, conceptual content is no longer given around realist criteria of validation, but depends on the recognition of others, so that argumentation is inscribed within the framework of a communal historical-conceptual articulation "Now, Brandom's account not only stresses the significance of history and sociality for accounts of mind and world. It also articulates a revisionist view of knowledge. Conceptual content is articulated by revisions made in response to social-historical developments." (Zambrana, 2017, p. 133). Hence, the locus of validation of arguments is determined by a historical-social-communal process in which conceptual content is exchanged.

The critique of exclusive dichotomies upheld in foundationalism suggests the possibility of postulating a "nonfoundational self-corrective conception of human inquiry based upon an understanding of how human agents are formed by, and actively participate in shaping, normative social practices" (Bernstein, 2010, p. X). This rejection of foundationalism would entail a form of fallibilism subject to intersubjective exchange of arguments and evidence, that is, to the formation of plural deliberative communities.

4.2. The Unity of Theory and Praxis

Zambrana (2017) understands that theme 4/5, Radical Contingency and Irreducible Plurality of Perspectives and Orientations, can be understood through *Praxis and Action* (1971) and *The New Constellation* (1991): "In both discussions, the promise of Hegel's thought are made clear in light of its deep limitations. These limitations are seen as crucial provocations. Indeed, in these discussions we see that, although Hegel's texts help us think through non-foundationalism, fallibilism, and a community of inquiry, they fail to do justice to the last two critical gestures of philosophical pluralism – contingency and plurality" (Zambrana, 2017, p. 133) In *Praxis and Action* Bernstein (1971) reconstructs the theoretical proposals of Marxism, existentialism, pragmatism, and positivism in the 19th and 20th centuries, in order to articulate a contemporary pragmatist perspective on action: "Bernstein remarks that each of these strands of philosophical inquiry can be combined to enlighten and deepen the others" (Shook 2005, p. 219). Zambrana (2017) interprets that the work is an exemplary demonstration of Bernstein's pluralism, to the extent that it 'juxtaposes' different perspectives to reveal the existing tensions between them and thus elucidate the phenomenon of praxis and action.

4.2.1. Self-Reflective Activity of the Geist

Bernstein interprets in *Praxis and Action* that the Hegelian *Geist* is constituted as self-created activity, from which it is possible to overcome the foundationalist dichotomy between idealism and empiricism, to the extent that the activity of the *Geist* is negativity that externalises itself in action, as the actualisation or concretisation of an intention: the *Geist* is the activity and, therefore, the intelligibility of things themselves that self-determine, independently of any externality; the *Geist* manifests itself in the material of the world, thus, from here, Bernstein "provocatively concludes that Hegel's idealism can be understood as a form of materialism" (Zambrana, 2017, p. 134). Bernstein further interprets that the externalised concretisation of intentions in the form of action, assumed in the dialectic between potentiality (at rest) and actualisation (in motion), articulates the unity of theory and practice.

4.2.2. Constellations, Pluralism, and Fallibilism

After examining the self-reflective unity of theory and action, Zambrana (2017) turns to *The New Constellation* (1992), a work in which Bernstein evaluates the idealism and necessity attributed to Hegelian dialectic and, especially, to *Aufhebung*. Then, if in Praxis and Action (1971) the philosopher postulates an unstable *both/and* dialectic, in the 1992 work this idea is a condition of possibility not only for understanding non-foundationalism, fallibilism, and the formation of critical communities of inquiry, but also for accounting for radical contingency and irreducible plurality of perspectives and orientations (themes 4/5). Given that in Hegel's modern philosophy, the *Geist* reaches the moment of reconciliation of opposites through the negation of difference itself (in fact, of any rupture *and/or* fracture), and in contrast, postmodern philosophy establishes the primacy of fragmentation, particularity, and contingency against any form of absolute totalization. Thus, Bernstein will agree with postmodern philosophy regarding contingency and plurality, without leading to forms of skeptical relativism: "Focus on context, specificity and locality does not mean we can avoid facing up to our affirmations – especially when they are challenged. For even if one maintains all effective critique must be local and specific, we still have to face up to what we are affirming when we engage in critique." (Bernstein, 1991, p. 318). Therefore, the pragmatist ethos involves using Hegel's distinction between 'abstract negation' and 'determinate negation'; and while the former criticizes concepts without understanding the agonistic activity itself with which it exclusively seeks the annihilation of the other (*difference*, a static binary logic), 'determinate negation' on the other hand, is directed towards a specific standpoint "It leads to a further determination, since it articulates the matter at hand concretely, in light of what has been rejected and overcome. Determinate negation is insightful since it comprehends the presuppositions and implications of its own activity" (Zambrana, 2017, p. 136). Abstract negation presupposes fixed binary oppositions, whereas determinate negation grasps the unstable relationship itself between the oppositions, based on the both/and dialectic, thus affirming contingency and plurality, which leads Bernstein to formulate the concept of "constellation": "This revisionary understanding of dialectics leads Bernstein to the notion of constellation, a concept originally developed by Walter Benjamin and TW Adorno. Constellation involves the juxtaposition of opposites. Now, constellations construct meaningful relations between stars in light of their spatial proximity. In a constellation, then, the relation between stars is not one of necessity. It is a matter of contingency. However, in allowing each star to shine in its singularity, a constellation allows each star to appear in its truth" (Bernstein, 2017, p. 136)

The constellation does justice to a pluralistic understanding in which particular elements are irreducible to a mode of Hegelian *Aufhebung*, as the unstable character of dialectics – as well as of oppositions – appeals to responsibility as the pragmatist ethos through which it is possible to "think and act in the 'in-between' interstices of forced reconciliations and radical dispersion" (Bernstein, 1992, p. 36), involving participants in a community of inquirers as first persons, open to the negative determination that dialogue entails, in a deliberative framework that revises arguments. With Shook (2005), the critical-reconstructive conversational framework of Bernstein's work is described, which occurs through the exposition of the arguments of a particular interlocutor and the consequent explication of their possible tensions, biases, resistances, or denials, based on the exercise of a dialectic without *Aufhebung*. This theoretical proposal, supported by a reading with/against Hegel, is practiced by Bernstein himself, who "brings into conversation widely separated philosophical positions and schools, arguing that they share much more than their respective practitioners think, and that they differ in ways to which they are equally blind" (Shook, 2005, p. 219).

5. Conclusions

Bernstein's pragmatist philosophy can be an appropriate epistemic framework for interpreting the 'paradigmatic juxtaposition' within the controversies of plural communities of scholars, particularly those that have arisen in the history of modern anthropology. Indeed, the 'constellation of researchers' presupposes not only the epistemological and methodological pluralism with which they attempt to resolve disputes, but also the fallibilism by which critical communities of researchers attempt to regularise their own research practices. This neo-pragmatist revision of Bernstein institutes conflict as a Hegelian dimension of conservation of scientific communities, while situating them temporally and spatially in a social-historical scope that gives meaning to their actual realisations.

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Short Article Report

Nietzsche is Dead: The Necessity of Religion in Postmodern Society

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Abstract: This paper aims to present the necessity of religion in the postmodern society. It also aims to criticize the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche's *God is dead*. This paper presents two main points to emphasize the need of postmodern society in religion. To do this, the works of a great sociologist Emile Durkheim were used, his studies became the method to debunk the ideas of Nietzsche on religion as unnecessary in the society. The first point discussed about the important functions of religion in the society such as social cohesion and social order and the last point tackled about how religion values life as Durkheim found out that a society with less involvement with religion has higher suicide rate. This paper provided clear insights on how to deal with the thoughts of Nietzsche against religion.

Keywords: religion; postmodernism; Friedrich Nietzsche; Emile Durkheim, sociology

1. Introduction

When Friedrich Nietzsche (1882) declared the death of God in his work "Gay Science" he was able to catch the attention of most intellectuals of his time to abandon religion. His declaration of "God is dead" became the major starting point of atheism to arise not only in Europe but also in the United States of America. Nietzsche's declaration of God is dead surely shook Christianity during the late 1800s.

In Nietzsche's Thus Spoke Zarathustra (1885), he emphasized that Christian morality is an inferior moral standard, that is why, he called for the reevaluation of morality. From this, he created the concept of Ubermensch, a man who overcame himself and his conventional morality. This Ubermensch became the symbol of a superman who overcame his morality taught by his society and was able to create his own.

Nietzsche's criticism of religion was grounded in his idea that religion is for the weak, and it teaches us to be stagnant and illogical. Since science and philosophy can explain things without religion, Nietzsche argued that there is no use for religion anymore. Nietzsche saw that religion teaches us to pray more and act less, for him, faith leads men to be ignorant and it avoids them for self-development (Nietzsche, 1886)

There were atheists, agnostics and other skeptics before Nietzsche. However, nobody can deny that his works became major milestones of Atheism around the world. They were thinkers in the Middle Ages who also criticized Christianity and other religions but they were not as successful as Friedrich Nietzsche. He planted seeds of atheism and skepticism in the minds of thinkers and readers during his time and up to now.

According to the General Social Survey (1970) only 5% of the population of the United States identified themselves as individuals who do not have religion or do not believe in it. Surprisingly, in the 1990's individuals who support atheism increased up to 30% of the actual population. In the second survey conducted with 10,000 adults, 6% said that they do not believe in God as an adult (Ecklund et al., 2020)

In the study conducted by Sumpter (2019) 35% of the millennials that he surveyed concluded that the church is irrelevant because it does not help them in their daily needs as individuals. This study from 2019 shows a negative impression of the younger generation in religion. Therefore, he concluded that millennials do not understand the functions of religion in society.

2. Materials and Methods

To present the necessity of religion in the postmodern society, the researcher used some of the well-known works of a great sociologist, Emile Durkheim, who is an expert in the field of Religion and Society. This paper focused on the two main points in criticizing Nietzsche's argument that religion is no longer necessary. Within the lens of Durkheim's ideas, the following arguments are presented:

First Point: Religion has crucial social functions in the postmodern world.

Second Point: Religion values life.

This paper aims to elaborate the necessity of religion in the postmodern world by presenting the two main points above. These arguments clearly discussed the benefits of postmodern society from religions and debunk the notion of Nietzsche in the context of philosophy and sociology.

3. Results and Discussion

Based on the works of Emile Durkheim, with the use of scientific method in his sociological studies, he gathered enough data to conclude that religion is still necessary even in the modern and postmodern world, while Nietzsche only provided unpolished arguments without any solid sociological bases to conclude that religion is not needed anymore. Nietzsche clearly lacked sociological groundings since religion is a social institution, therefore, it can be concluded that Nietzsche's view of religion is weak.

This paper presents the two main points supporting that religion is still necessary until today.

First Point: Religion has crucial social functions

In *The Antichrist* (1895) Nietzsche questioned the utility of religion in society, for him religion serves as a tool to manipulate and control the potential of individuals to grow. He criticized that Christianity has a negative effect on human development and its values such as altruism, humility and obedience impact individuals to be weak and suppress their human desires and instincts. Nietzsche was so certain that Christianity must be rejected because it hinders human beings to find their true greatness and for him, Christianity does not really contribute anything in the society.

In Durkheim's *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life* (1912) he came up with sociological terms such as Social Cohesion and Collective Effervescence. In the context of the sociological perspective of Durkheim, Social Cohesion is a social tool to maintain solidarity by the means of shared beliefs, norms and rituals. Social cohesion keeps social control, without it, social structures will be demolished that will bring societal chaos. According to Durkheim (1912) in a society individuals gather together and communicate the same ideas and feelings and they also participate in the same human activities. This is called Collective Effervescence and it serves to unify the society.

In *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, Durkheim emphasized that religious activities, symbols, rituals, and beliefs bind individuals together to keep the society in order. Religion, as Durkheim argued, is a force that maintains social solidarity which is needed for a peaceful community that avoids conflicts with each other. Solidarity is what the postmodern society needs, social order must be prioritized to attain a peaceful and harmonious society. In addition, religion provides objective moral principles that maintain order in a community of diverse individuals. The moral standards provided by religion shape individuals to behave in the light of morality.

In conclusion, Nietzsche's philosophy and views on religions is not morality sound and it will only cause division in the postmodern society because his idea is grounded with his belief of superiority and selfishness. What the society needs today is solidarity and not division. Thus, Nietzsche's criticism on religions should be reevaluated and doubted.

Second Point: Religion values Life

One of the key philosophies of Nietzsche is the *Will to Power*, he encourages society to always aim for self-transformation and overcoming themselves. Nietzsche values life in his own way, for him individuals should live fully as beings with Will to Power. Nietzsche wrote, "I teach you the Overman. Man is something that shall be overcome. What have you done to overcome him?" He created the concept of *Overman or Ubermensch*. This character pertains to someone who has overcome himself and surpassed his human limitations, conventional morality and lives freely and creatively. (Nietzsche, 1883-1885)

Without a doubt, Nietzsche values life so much. However, this is problematic because his idea of life as a valuable thing relies on his individualistic philosophy. Most of his works

tackle egocentrism and the idea of self-improvement. Nietzsche should have considered that a human being is a social being, he cannot separate an individual from his society. He forgot to consider that debunking religion is invalidating his philosophy that life is important.

In Durkheim's *Suicide: A Study in Sociology* (1897) he argued that religion has an important role to keep human life. This is a mind-blowing study where Durkheim correlated the relationship between religion and suicide. He found out that a society where individuals has strong religious and social belongingness shown to have low suicide rates. He saw that religion serves as social and moral support to its members to cope with life. Religion decreases the feeling of isolation. Durkheim found out that communities with weak religious involvement tend to have higher suicide rates. The results of his study indicate that religion is needed if society wants to keep life.

Therefore, Nietzsche's idea that religion is not necessary anymore is invalid because even he agreed that life is important, and religion is the only social agent that can keep life going. Nietzsche's critique of religion must be reexamined in the context of Sociology as a scientific handmaid of Philosophy of Religion.

4. Conclusions

In conclusion, as presented above, religion is still necessary in the postmodern society. Religion has important social functions that the society needs to survive. The two main points of this paper showed that Nietzsche's views of religion are flawed in the context of philosophy and sociology. His criticisms as presented have loopholes and need to be reevaluated. Nietzsche's *God is dead* needs to be reexamined by society if it is the correct philosophy to be considered in the 21st century. As argued, religion is an essential element of society, if it vanishes, there will be chaos in the societal structure and the individuals will suffer as a whole community.

This paper can be used by the future researchers of Philosophy of Religion and Pastoral Sociology to present that religion is still necessary even in the postmodern era. The churches will surely benefit from this as well as organizations that promote peaceful and harmonious society. This paper offers valuable and clear insights about the importance of religion to keep the order of individuals in society.

This paper only criticizes Nietzsche's works which are related to his negative impressions against religion, it does not include his other philosophical themes and ideas. This paper is prone to biases, that is why, careful selection of texts and unbiased statements must be done. Also, this research might be prone to subjectivity, hence, theories, scientific studies and data must be used correctly.

The researcher recommends that to improve this paper, future researchers need more descriptive and correlational studies about the decrease rate of religious individuals in local and global contexts. Since this paper aims to be scientific to debunk the critique of Friedrich Nietzsche against religion, more statistical data must be used. The researcher also recommends writing this paper in a very precise and clear manner, since it is also meant for young readers. The original writing style of this paper might help to attract more readers who are not fond of long articles.

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